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The White Pine Mine is a copper mine located in 
northern Michigan. In late 1985, it was reopened after 
several years of being inoperable. The newly formed 
company, named the Copper Range company, was founded on 
the basis of employee ownership, involvement, and 
participation. To succeed, it would require dramatic 
improvements in efficiency, productivity and attitudes.
If successful, this would be a radical change from the 
relatively unproductive, inefficient, labor troubled 
operation of the past.
In the past three years since reopening, the White 
Pine Mine has experienced some startling changes. It has 
reduced the height of the organizational hierarchy. There 
have been distinctive changes in the relationship between 
management and union, thus allowing for more efficient 
work methods.
The company has experienced remarkable increases in 
productivity. This has been accomplished by producing 
more copper, using fewer employees than it has in the 
past. Throughout this period. Copper Range has also suc­
ceeded in making White Pine a safer place to work. Acci­
dent frequency rates have dropped significantly during the 
three years of the operation.
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The new company has reduced its initial production 
costs to a point where it was below the current market 
price of copper. With copper selling at approximately 
$0.65 per pound when the mine reopened, this meant the 
difference between success and failure. Lowering cost was 
accomplished in part by restructuring the wages and com­
pensation received by the employees. The average wage to 
hourly employees is only $8.50 per hour which is nearly 
$4.00 per hour lower than previously. Employees receive 
additional compensation through incentive pay, profit 
sharing, and employee ownership of the company.
The regeneration of the Copper Range has been 
influenced by many factors, both internal and external. 
External factors include the unemployment rate and 
economic conditions in the area. This prompted the 
employees to return to work. The work force that had been 
employed by the previous company remained in the area 
largely intact. They chose not to leave the area for a 
variety of reasons. The lower price of copper also acted 
as an influential factor in that it helped to solidify the 
employees toward the necessity of making the operation run 
efficiently and cheaply.
There were also a number of internal factors which 
have helped to shape the company's progress. The employee 
involvement plan has been a distinctive factor in helping
iv
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the company to mend its old ways. Changing the management 
style from autocratic to participatory has also been very 
important.
In February of 1988, the company experienced a fall 
of ground which eliminated its primary beltline. This 
curtailed the regular operations of the mine for a period 
of time, and nearly pushed the company into bankruptcy. 
Only after many months of hard work were they able to 
return to normal operations.
The success of the Copper Range Company is indis­
putable. However, it is experiencing some problems which 
threaten to undermine the foundation of the operation.
Many of the hourly employees have perceptions of inequity 
and inequality. They do not feel like owners or feel that 
they have been treated fairly. There is a problem in the 
participatory system in that there appear to be autocratic 
forces still at work within the system. There also seems 
to be a problem in that the company expected the employees 
to participate at one level, while some employees expected 
to participate at another. The incentive system is 
experiencing several problems associated with it. It is 
complicated. The employees have not realized the large 
improvements in rewards they have expected in light of 
recent improvements in the price of copper. The end
v
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result is that the workers' initial attitudes of en­
thusiasm have deteriorated.
In an effort to solve these problems, the company 
might consider the following alternatives:
o the union could analyze its own position and 
responsibilities to determine the best way it 
could serve both its members and the company; 
o put all employees on a salary basis; 
o alter the incentive system;
o management could analyze its own structure to 
insure it is operating as it should be. Locate 
and correct symptoms of autocratic management, 
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The writing of this report is the cumulation of two 
phases in my life. The first is the time I spent working 
at White Pine learning the difference between theory and 
practice. The second is the time spent at the Colorado 
School of Mines doing my graduate studies. It was there 
that I started to interpret what I had seen.
The contents of this report are the results of the 
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be possible.
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Thank you to Larry Chabot and Dave Pieti for their 
assistance. Without their patience in providing 
information and fielding my many questions, this report 
would have never gotten off the ground.
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The White Pine Mine is located in northern Michigan. 
It has been in operation since 1952. During the first 
thirty years of its life it has grown to become the second 
largest underground copper mine in the United States. The 
prosperity of the mine did not look as if it would ever 
end.
The good times would end. The economic depression 
that affected the rest of the mining industry in the early 
1980's did not leave the White Pine Mine undamaged.
Amidst continued economic troubles, the mine continually 
curtailed its operations. In 1983, the company experi­
enced labor disputes with the United Steel Workers of 
America. In August of that year, the mine was struck by 
the remainder of its hourly employees. This effectively 
marked the end of the White Pine Mine.
After over two years of being shut down, the White 
Pine Mine was reopened under new management and a new 
philosophy. The new Copper Range Company was founded on 
the principles of employee ownership and participation.
The employees adopted the operating philosophy presented 
in Figure 1. In order to make the operation a success, 
there would have to be dramatic improvements in costs, 





WE, THE EMPLOYEE OWNERS OF COPPER RANGE 
COMPANY, ARE COMMITTED TO BEING THE SAFEST,
MOST PRODUCTIVE, AND AMONG THE LOWEST COST,
MOST PROFITABLE PRODUCERS OF COPPER IN THE 
WORLD. THIS WILL RESULT IN HIGH PAY AND JOB 
SECURITY.
THESE GOALS WILL BE ACHIEVED BY OPERATING 
WITH EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AT ALL LEVELS IN AN 
ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST, RESPECT, PRIDE, POSITIVE 
ATTITUDE, OPEN COMMUNICATIONS AND A WILLINGNESS 
TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESS.
OUR SUCCESS DEPENDS UPON HARMONIOUS 
RELATIONSHIPS, SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION OF 
ALL THE EMPLOYEE OWNERS OF COPPER RANGE COMPANY 
IN THE CONSISTENT AND PATIENT APPLICATION OF 
THIS PHILOSOPHY.
FIGURE 1. COPPER RANGE OPERATING PHILOSOPHY 
SOURCE: COPPER RANGE COMPANY
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attitudes. It has been three years since the mine 
reopened. In the course of this paper, we will first 
learn about the nature and history of the White Pine Mine. 
Next we will discuss the successes and failures that the 
operation has experienced. We will then attempt to 
isolate the major problems that have been hampering the 
company's progress. Finally, possible alternatives will 
be discussed in light of Copper Range's situation.
The information for this report was obtained from a 
variety of sources. Among them are newspaper and magazine 
articles, historical and current company records, and 
Copper Range publications. All of these types of sources 
are easily documented. However, some of what is presented 
in this report is not easily documentable. The author 
introduces many opinions and conclusions. They are based 
on his personal observations and experiences from December 
of 1985 to August of 1987 during which time he was an 
employee of Copper Range. They are also based on many 
conversations with other employees during that time, and 
interviews conducted on a recent fact finding trip to the 
property.
In the course of this report, every effort will be 
made to relate the origin of these opinions when they are 
presented. This report was written based upon information 
obtained in the latter part of 1988. The opinions
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expressed, comments quoted, and conclusions drawn reflect 
the condition of the operation at that time. They do not 
reflect the company/s position in the future should 
unforeseen events alter the nature of the operation.
One factor should be pointed out. When the mine 
first reopened, it was based on producing copper with a 
very small profit margin. Since that time the price of 
copper has improved, and that margin has increased 
dramatically. This fact has altered the environment in 
which the Copper Range Company operates. It may be having 
unknown effects on the company and its employees. More 
detailed analysis would be required to further define what 
those effects might be.
Location
The White Pine Mine is located in Ontonagon County, 
Michigan (U.S.A.). This is in the region commonly 
referred to as the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. The mine 
is located along Highway M-64. It is approximately 12 
miles north of Bergland, or six miles south of Silver 
City. Those not familiar with the area might find it 
easier to relate to the fact that it is 150 miles due east 
of Duluth, Minnesota, 120 miles due west of Marquette, 







FIGURE 2. LOCATION OF WHITE PINE FACILITIES
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The location is a fairly isolated one. The mine 
sits in the heart of the Ottawa National Forest and is 
very near to the Porcupine Mountain State Park. Lake 
Superior is only six miles to the north.
The topography is one of gently rolling mountains 
which range from an elevation of several hundred to about
2,000 feet. The area is characteristically covered with 
thick dense woods and ground foliage. This abundant lum­
ber resource helps to sustain one of the Upper Peninsula's 
primary industries —  lumber and paper products.
The weather in this area plays a very important role 
in living here. The area has four distinct seasons.
Winter is by far the longest season. It is not uncommon 
to receive several hundred inches of snowfall in a single 
season. It dominates many aspects of life in the Upper 
Peninsula.
This region offers many alternatives for different 
lifestyles. What it lacks in social and cultural facili­
ties, it makes up for in recreational opportunities. 
Opinions about the area are widely varied.
The Town of White Pine
Adjacent to the mine, on the opposite side of 
Highway M-64 is the town of White Pine, Michigan. White 
Pine was started as a company town in the early 1950s.
The town and the mine both sprang from the wilderness
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simultaneously. White Pine can be readily described by 
another cliche. It is a "one horse town." The prosperity 
of the town, or decline as the case may be, can be 
directly seen in the reflection of the prosperity of the 
mine. Row after row of affordable, modern homes were used 
by the company's employees. As the mine prospered, so did 
the town. At approximately the time the mine was nearing 
its peak, there were plans to expand the town. Retail 
establishments were built. There were elaborate plans to 
develop recreational facilities in the area. Additional 
streets were laid out. Dozens of new home plots were 
surveyed and utility hook-ups were installed. It looked 
as though White Pine was well on its way to a really 
bright future.
The last few years paint a much different picture 
for the town. When the mine seemed to have died, so did 
the town. School enrollment plummeted. Retail establish­
ments closed. Many of the town services (sewer, water, 
etc.) provided by the mine became endangered. The rows of 
new home plots developed stood, for the most part, vacant, 
overgrown, and waiting for the home builders that might 
never come. At one point the town came to be described as 
a modern day ghost town. Only in the last few years has 
the town of White Pine experienced any regeneration.
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History of the White Pine Ore Body
The history of mining in the area goes back 
approximately 125 years. The Nonesuch formation was first 
discovered in 1865. Mining activity occurred on the 
property through the years 1879-1881 as the Nonesuch Mine. 
The property was later sold to Calumet & Hecla Mining.
They did not conduct any exploration or development 
activity until after the turn of the century. Subsequent 
mining activity produced in excess of 18 million pounds of 
native copper from 1915 to 1920.
Copper Range purchased the White Pine property in 
1929. It was purchased at an Ontonagon County Sheriff's 
sale for $119,000. There was relatively little mining 
activity on the property through the 1940's.
The true development of the White Pine Mine began in 
the early 1950's. The United States Government encouraged 
the company to investigate the possibility of developing 
the ore body to recover the overlooked chalcocite. 
(Previous mining activity had concentrated exclusively on 
native copper.) Subsequent tests resulted in a 
construction loan of $67 million from the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation under the Defense Production Act.
Development of the White Pine facilities began in 
March of 1952. The first ore was mined in April of 1953. 
The mill was operational in October of 1954. The smelter
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was completed and operational in January of 1955. The 
property was on its way to a long and prosperous life.
Operations at the mine continued normally, but not 
necessarily uneventfully. Over the next twenty-nine 
years, a Copper Range company news release dated April 22, 
1977 announced that it had entered into an agreement with 
the Louisiana Land and Exploration Company to purchase the 
White Pine facilities. At this time the mine became the 
White Pine Copper Division of Copper Range.
The company further expanded its surface facilities 
in 1981. It completed the construction of a new electro­
lytic refinery. This refinery represents state-of-the-art 
technology, and enables Copper Range to produce the purest 
copper anywhere in the world. It was completed at a cost 
of $78 million.
Completing and starting the refinery would have 
appeared to mark the start of a new era for the mine. 
However, they were about to enter into an era which was 
anything but prosperous. Early in 1982 the company 
announced that it was laying off more employees. This was 
the result of several factors such as depressed copper 
prices and increasing wages. (These will be discussed 
later in the report.) In a news release dated March 11, 
1982, O.E. Anderson summarized the situation by saying:
MContinuing poor economic conditions in the copper
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industry and their effect on our operating results over 
the past few quarters, have forced us to consider more 
drastic measures to stem the continued losses.” These 
cutbacks would continue until July of 1983 when the mine 
would finally shut down amidst continued economic and 
labor problems.
The Death of the White Pine Mine
The beginning of the end for the White Pine Mine 
came, quite unobtrusively over a year before the final 
strike. On May 11, 1982, the National Nonferrous 
Coordinated Bargaining Committee (NNCBC) adopted a 
resolution concerning the current economic depression 
affecting the copper industry. Economic hard times had 
hit White Pine, but also the copper mines in Arizona and 
other parts of the United States. The NNCBC, which 
represents all local copper unions, was determined to 
protect the hard-won gains of their employees by sticking 
together. In that resolution they stated that ”we hereby 
affirm our pledge of unity to remain steadfast in our 
determination not to take a backward step or to destroy 
our established wage and benefit structure to satisfy the 
temporary whim of any company.”
That resolution would eventually come back to haunt 
the White Pine management. In July of 1983, the Copper 
Range, as well as all other copper companies were faced
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with labor contract negotiations. The management's 
approach to the situation was sincere and with a positive 
attitude. The NNCBC had recently made concessions to the 
steel industry due to poor economic conditions. The White 
Pine management figured that they too would be given con­
cessions by the union. According to company spokesman 
Larry Chabot, "We feel they will be consistent in their 
attitude toward concessions when they consider the White 
Pine situation" (Hill, Positive View, 21 July 1983).
Unfortunately, the union was determined to stick to 
its hard line. It would not consider any concessions for 
the troubled copper mine. Kennecott Copper Company of 
Arizona had already come to an agreement with the union, 
and the union was determined that this was to set a 
precedent for the rest of the industry. White Pine would 
receive no preferential treatment. The company's contract 
offer was going to have to have parity with the western 
contracts. This was considered to be totally unacceptable 
to the company management, and they urged the union to 
consider a local contract. Copper Range representatives 
even traveled to union headquarters in Pittsburgh to show 
them the company books, but it was all in vain.
Contract negotiations continued until the end of 
July. The company remained steadfast in its need for 
concessions, and the union maintained that they weren't
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going to get any. Eldon Kirsch, president of Local Union 
5024, reported that "We told them we'd take the same 
settlement as the rest of the industry, no increase for 
three years" (Goffin. Contract, 29 July 1983). In other 
words, they would accept a base wage freeze, but there 
would be no adjustments made to the cost of living adjust­
ment (COLA) or any other benefits.
This proved to be the undoing of the negotiations.
On August 1, 1983, the union voted to strike the property. 
This was not the first time such an action was taken as 
will be shown later. The strike would affect nearly 1,100 
union members, although there remained only 130 of them 
working to actually walk off their jobs. The vote to 
strike was overwhelmingly in favor of the move.
The strike would prove to be the most devastating 
one yet experienced at White Pine. The differences would 
not be settled, the workers would never have an oppor­
tunity to return to work for the old company. The union 
obviously felt that it had an honest reason for not giving 
into any concessions. According to Eldon Kirsch, "We asked 
the company on a number of occasions if the concessions 
will bring our people back to work and they said 'no.'"
The resulting stalemate between the company and the 
union would continue indefinitely. Conditions in the 
copper industry continued to deteriorate. On May 16,
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1984, Congressman Robert Davis testified on Petition 201
concerning copper imports to the U.S. In that testimony,
he summarized by saying:
The American copper industry is in the worst 
position it has been in for many, many years.
Some experts say that it has been 50 years since 
copper economies have been so poor. In my own 
district in Michigan, what was once one of the 
major producers in the country has lost over 90% 
of a work force which numbers over 3,000 people.
The situation took a turn on December 11, 1984. It 
was on that day that Louisiana Land and Exploration 
Company sold the White Pine Mine to Echo Bay Mines, Ltd. 
of Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. Initial reports indicated 
that the sale would not affect the mine operations, which 
really did not mean much since there was not much in the 
way of operations to be affected. Paddy Broughton, Vice 
President of Echo Bay stated that, "We intend to maintain 
(White Pine) in a shut down position while we evaluate 
what the alternatives are." (Mine likely to remain 
closed, 12 December 1984). Unfortunately, the alterna­
tives were not all that promising.
The Regeneration of the White Pine Mine
In the early months of 1985, two situations began to 
develop which were in direct conflict with each other.
The first was the announcement in late February by Echo 
Bay that it was considering plans to pull the pumps at
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White Pine and flood the mine. This would truly mark the 
end of the operation. Echo Bay had been unable to locate 
a buyer, and it was reportedly costing them $240,000 per 
month to maintain the pumps. O.E. Anderson, former 
general manger of the mine, said that "Echo Bay cannot 
continue to sustain the kind of losses they are incurring 
in a non-operating facility" (Tucker, Critical, 22 
February 1985). The state of Michigan offered to compen­
sate Echo Bay for one-half the cost, but it was not accep-
The second situation which was developing was a plan 
by former Copper Range Vice President Russell Wood to 
purchase White Pine and run it at a profit. Wood believed 
that the mine could be operated because of the "highly 
mechanized facility" and also because of the "excellent 
work force available'" (Partnership seeks White Pine 
Mine, 27 February 1985). Wood hoped to form a partnership 
with the employees. On April 4, 1985, just prior to the 
start of negotiations with the union. Wood summarized his 
intentions in his statement that, "We're going to see if 
we can make a deal with the steelworkers on the new cor­
poration and with Echo Bay on the terms of the sale"
(Lajeunesse, Sale). This would prove to be easier said 
than done as time continued to slip away on Echo Bay's 
threat to flood the mine.
ted
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As negotiations proceeded, Wood's and the union's 
optimism about the prospects of reopening the mine quickly 
turned sour as talks stalled. The initial wage proposals 
presented by the union might force the new company into 
bankruptcy before it even got started. Apparently they 
were still under the impression that they were living in 
the old days when they could command their own destiny. 
According to Russ Wood, "We can bend, but not to the point 
of bankruptcy" (Tucker, Hopes Dim, 12 April 1985).
Time continued to run out as Echo Bay's deadline of 
May 1 approached. They received a grant of $200,000 to 
keep the pumps running until that time. Negotiations 
started again with the help of Governor James Blanchard.
He is credited by many as being the catalyst which brought 
all of the parties together. However, one cannot deny the 
efforts of Russ Wood, along with his associates Mike Dunn 
and Dr. Herman Ponder for sticking with it for as long as 
they did. There must have been times when they wanted to 
simply walk away and forget it. Wood managed to put 
everything into perspective on April 22. Addressing a 
group of approximately 500 potential employees and 
concerned citizens on the future of White Pine, and the 
need for everyone to cooperate in the negotiation process, 
he said:
A week from Tuesday, White Pine turns into a
pumpkin, and once the mine is flooded we will
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never see it operated again in our lifetime....
My financial losses are behind me. I can walk 
away from this, but your losses are ahead of 
you. You have more at stake than I have.
(Tucker, Time Running Out, 22 April 1985).
All of these factors seem to have gotten people's
attention, for just a mere three days later, an agreement
was reached that all parties felt they could live with.
Everyone was very optimistic and ready to return to work.
The highlights of the contract include:
o $8.50/hour average wage plus a minimum of
$.5O/hour incentive and $2.21 in additional
benefits.
o 70% of the company's common stock to be
distributed to the employees. Available upon 
death, retirement or demonstrated hardship, 
o 30% of the company's profits to be distributed 
annually or semi-annually, 
o Relaxed work rules necessary to facilitate a 
cooperative participatory effort by all parties. 
This was a very complicated contract, the likes of 
which had never been seen before in the U.S. mining indus 
try. (The details will be discussed in detail further 
on.) Entering into this new agreement was done optimis­
tically but not without some reservations. Eldon Kirsch, 
president of Local Union 5024, indicated to his members 
that "there are going to be problems with the implementa­
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tion of this. No doubt. In six months you guys are going 
to hate us." (Kinsley, New Pact, 27 April 1985). The 
mine was saved, almost.
The financing of the new operation turned out to be 
an almost bigger problem than the negotiation with the 
union. After the agreement was reached with the steel­
workers, everything looked as though it was going to go 
through quickly. Russ Wood targeted July 1 as the date on 
which they would begin hiring employees at White Pine. 
Unfortunately, things were not to proceed quite that 
quickly. Various stalls, glitches, and setbacks in the 
financing negotiations would eventually push the closing 
date to the early part of November. This was not exactly 
what everyone had in mind, but it was still better that 
what they had before ... nothing.
Below is a brief summary of the terms of the White 
Pine financing deal.
o $3 million loan from the Michigan Economic 
Development Authority, 
o An approximate $20 million loan from Echo Bay 
Mines Ltd. to be repaid from the sale of silver 
by-products. 
o Approximately $5 million in bank loans, 
o A grant of $2.5 million from the state for job 
training.
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o Two small cities block grants totalling $1.5 
million.
o $18 million in loans from Philipps Bros.
A New Start
Once the announcement was made that the final 
closing had been signed, "White Pine breathed a 'hugh sigh 
of relief'" (Tucker, 11-7-85), the creation of a new 
company would put almost 1,000 people back to work in 
the economically depressed Upper Peninsula. The venture 
was founded on the basis that it would be a participatory 
company, with cooperation among all levels of the work 
force. Lack of cooperation might well mean the end of it 
all. The company did receive quite a bit of assistance to 
get from the early stages of negotiation to the final 
step, but Russ Wood, as well as most employees of the new 
company, realized that "It is up to us to make it work
from now on" (Hill, White Pine Reopening, 8 November
1985).
In the very first issue of the Copper Range Report,
Russ Wood issued the following challenge to all
employee/owners of the new company:
This is our mine —  yours, mine and all of those
yet to join us. It is ours to make something
of, ours to make a good provider for our needs, 
and those of our families. Let's all do our 
part to make it a profitable, safe, and 
enjoyable place to work.
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This was a very positive statement, for it gave each 
employee something to think about as they became part of 
the new operation. Only time would tell if the "Dream" 
envisioned by Russ Wood would come to be a reality. 
Perhaps the situation was better summarized by an unknown 
employee who said, "Remember: the old way put us out of
business. Ask not what the company can do for you, but 
what you can do for vour company" (Copper Range Report # 
1) •
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THE WHITE PINE PROPERTY AND FACILITIES
Before proceeding to a discussion of the results of 
the reopening of the White Pine Mine, it will be benefi­
cial to digress for a period to discuss the nature of the 
White Pine operation. In that way, the reader will have a 
better understanding of what goes on there on a day-to-day 
basis.
Geology
The White Pine ore body is a large, relatively flat 
stratiform deposit. It is several miles in diameter at 
some locations. The deposit is found at the base of the 
Nonesuch Shale, an unmetamorphosed Upper Precambrian 
siltstone. There are usually two shale horizons present, 
separated by a mineralized sandstone layer. The copper 
mineralization is predominantly found in the form of 
chalcocite, but there is some native copper present. Some 
regions of the Copper Harbor conglomerate sandstone 
contain high grade copper.
A more detailed description of the geology of the 
White Pine ore body was written in a paper by R.W. Seasor 
and A.C. Brown. R.W. "Bob" Seasor is the Director of 
Geology and Exploration with the new Copper Range. Seasor 
and Brown presented their paper, entitled "White Pine 
Stratiform Copper Deposit" to the Proterozoic Sediment- 
Hosted Stratiform Copper Deposits of Upper Michigan and
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Belt Supergroup of Idaho and Montana conference at
Carleton University in May of 1986. The section on mine
stratigraphy is presented below. A complete copy of the
paper is presented in Appendix A of this report.
The Mine Stratigraphy. The White Pine mine is 
confined to a narrow stratigraphie zone 
following the contact between the Copper Harbor 
Conglomerate and Nonesuch Shale formations. At 
the mine scale, copper is found predominantly as 
disseminated chalcocite and minor native copper 
within the basal 0-20 metres of the -200 metre- 
thick Nonesuch Shale. The uppermost 0-6 metres 
of the underlying Copper Harbor Conglomerate may 
also be mineralized, typically with with native 
copper. The mined sections occur in two similar 
sedimentary sequences, each 2-3 metres thick and 
consisting of a we11-bedded siltstone-shale unit 
overlying a coarse-grained sandstone. The basal 
sequence consists of the Lower Sandstone and 
Parting Shale, and upper sequence is composed of 
the Upper Sandstone and Upper Shale (Figure 3).
The Upper Sandstone is separated from the 
Parting Shale by a minor erosional surface 
characterized by incised stream channels and 
oxidation of the uppermost beds of the Parting 
Shale.
Within the mine sections, disseminated ore-grade 
copper is confined more specifically to a few 
narrow stratigraphie beds (especially beds 21,
23, 26, 41, 43 and 46). Intervening beds 
contain minor amounts of copper which are mined 
with the high-grade beds to form sections 
sufficiently thick for conventional room-and- 
pillar operations. Mining may selectively 
follow only the Parting Shale, a section 
approximately 2.6 m thick? or it may advance 
separately but in parallel along both the 
Parting Shale and the Upper Shale (the latter 
preferably limited to an approximately 1.7 m- 
thick section comprising beds 41, 43 and the 
lower part of 44); or it may exploit a "full 

























Siltstone, Gray and 
shale, black widely 
laminated
Siltstone, dark gray 
Massive bedded
Siltstone, Red-brown to 
gray, massive bedded 
with limy nodules
f  Ideal Black Massive Back 
Siltstone, Gray and 















'V ie w e r  Trans
Copper H arbor  
Form ation
Sandstone, Gray, fine 
grnd w/blk shale prtngs
Sandstone, red to gray 
fine to med to coarse 
grained w/conglomer­
atic lenses. Occ. 
shale member, occ 
cross bedded near 
base
Siltstone, gray & shale, 
red, widely laminated
Siltstone, gray k  shale 
blk. wide lu laminated_
Siltstone, dark gray, 
massive bedded, w/oee 
limy blebs & nodules
Siltstone, red to gray, 
massive w /  “Junior " 
line" at base
Siltstone, gray and 
shale, black, thinly 
laminated
Sandstone Gray, fine grnd 
with blk shale partings
Lbs copper/ton Mining Configurations
6C 80 Mtifie* 
SksJ*






P e ril pp 
Skeie 
A tee  ml
P erliep
S te /e Z
75 MH
FIGURE 3. STRATIGRAPHIC COLUMN FOR THE MINE SECTION 
OF THE BASAL NONESUCH SHALE, AND DEFINITION OF MINING 
CONFIGURATIONS AND HORIZONS AT WHITE PINE 
(from Ensign, et al. 1968)
SOURCE: COPPER RANGE COMPANY
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beds from the Lower Sandstone to bed 44 of the 
Upper Shale, a section measuring approximately 
4.6 m in thickness. Native copper values in a 
chloritic facies of the Lower Sandstone
(Hamilton, 1967) may call for mining of the
Parting Shale footwall, commonly to a depth of 
approximately one-half metre but in some cases 
to a depth of several metres.
Mineral Reserves and Mine Life
Figure 4 shows a silhouette of the area mined from 
April 1, 1953 to April 1, 1987. Thirty-four years of
activity have resulted in over 10.5 square miles of
underground workings. This makes White Pine the second 
largest underground copper mine in the United States.
Copper Range recently employed the firm of Stearns- 
Rogers to review and verify their copper reserves.
Stearn's report was dated October 8, 1987. Sections of it 
are presented below.
Table 1 is a summary of the results determined by 
Stearns-Rogers at the current production rate of 5.9 
million tons per year. The numbers in Table 1 indicate 
enough proven and probable wholly owned reserves to last 
approximately 32 more years. This is determined using an 
in-place cut-off grade of 20 pounds of copper per ton, and 
an extraction of 57 percent (Preliminary Prospectus, 15 
December 1987, p. 22-23). Figure 5 shows a graphic repre­
sentation of the numbers in Table 1. As can be seen, the 
area yet to be mined is quite extensive.
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FIGURE 4. AREA PREVIOUSLY MINED AT WHITE PINE 
SOURCE: COPPER RANGE COMPANY
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TABLE Is WHITE PINE MINE-ORE RESERVES* 
SOURCE: COPPER RANGE COMPANY
As of August 1, 1987 






Grade of Extractable 
Copper Pounds of 
('Pounds/ Ton) Copper ( ’OOOs)
Wholly-Owned:
Proven • 113,191 21.93 2,482,543
Probable 78,869 21.41 1,688,496
Total . . 192,060 21.72 4,171,039
Leased:
Proven 20,678 29.73 614,720
Probable . . 1,190 27.61 32,856
Total . . 21,868 29.61 647,576
Overall Total . 213,928 22.52 4,818,615
Not* :—
* Ore rtstrves r*pr*s*nt mining grad* and do not reflect processing losses
“Reserve” means that part of a mineral deposit which could be economically and 
legally extracted or produced at the time of the reserve determination. Reserves 
are customarily referred to as “ore reserves" when dealing with metalliferous 
minerals.
“Proven reserves” means reserves for which quantity is computed from dimen­
sions revealed in outcrops, trenches, workings or drill holes; grade and/or-quality 
are computed from the results of detailed sampling. The sites for inspection, 
sampling and measurement arc spaced so closely and the geologic character is 
sufficiently defined that size, shape, depth and mineral content of reserves are well 
established.
“Probable reserves” means reserves for which quantity and grade and/or quality 
are computed from information similar to that used for proven reserves but the 
sites for sampling are farther apart or are otherwise less adequately spaced. The 
degree of assurance, although lower than that for proven reserves, is high enough 
to assume continuity between points of observation.
“Cut-off grade” means the lowest grade of mineralized rock that qualifies as ore 
grade in a given deposit and is also used as the lowest grade below which the 
mineralized rock currently cannot be profitably exploited.
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FIGURE 5: WHITE PINE MINE-ORE RESERVES
SOURCE: COPPER RANGE COMPANY
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Mining Methods
The White Pine Mine operates with a conventional 
room and pillar mining method. Mining proceeds along 
mining fronts in various "units.” The units currently in 
operation are 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, and 99 in the southwest 
area, 32 and 37 in the southernmost area, and units 17,
18, and 19 located to the east (see Figure 6 located 
inside cover). These units to the east are located in 
Division 1, which was activated after a fall of ground in 
the vicinity of 23000N by 33000E eliminated the primary 
belt line in February of 1988.
The mining operation at White Pine is of a cyclic 
nature. It consists of all of the unit operations of 
drilling, blasting, mucking, hauling, bolting, as well as 
all auxiliary and support positions. Figure 7 is a 
graphic representation of the mining cycle involved at the 
White Pine Mine.
The only major difference in the mining method used 
between the various units is dependent on the geology. As 
was stated in the paper by R. Seasor, the geology of the 
White Pine orebody primarily follows one of the three 
configurations: Full Column, Parting Shale, and Upper
Shale. There is another less common configuration called 
the Modified Upper Shale. It is utilized in those 
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FIGURE 7: ROOM AND PILLAR MINING METHOD
SOURCE: COPPER RANGE COMPANY
ER-3708 29
various mining configurations are depicted in Figure 8.
The configuration utilized in any particular unit is de­
pendent on the geology in that area.
Ore is fed onto Stamler feeder breakers where it is 
reduced to minus eight inches. Once that is completed, it 
is transferred onto conveyor belts to be transported out 
of the mine. The belts are represented by the darker 
lines on Figure 6. They vary in width from 36 to 54 
inches. All muck is eventually removed from the mine 
where the Upper Flight conveyor reaches the portal (at 
approximately 3400ON by 32000E).
Once the muck is delivered to the surface, it pro­
ceeds via conveyor belt to the processing stages. Below 
is a brief description of each. Figure 9 depicts the 
sequence.
The first step is the mill where the material is 
reduced to minus 5/8 inch. It is placed into coarse ore 
bins for storage until it is ready to go to the grinding 
stage. The grinding is performed in one of three sections 
each of which consists of two 10-1/2 foot by 14 foot rod 
mills, and two 12 foot by 13 foot ball mills. Once the 
grinding circuit is completed, the material is transferred 
to the flotation cells. The concentrate obtained from the 






FIGURE 8: VARIOUS MINING CONFIGURATIONS
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FIGURE 9: SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS AT WHITE PINE
SOURCE: COPPER RANGE COMPANY
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filtering techniques. The recovery in the concentrate is 
88%.
Once leaving the mill in the form of concentrate, 
the material is dried in a gas fired rotary drier. Once 
dried, it is fed into the No. 2 reverberatory furnace 
which can handle 500 to 600 tons of concentrate per day. 
The matte produced (approximately 63% copper) is 
transferred to the converters. Once there it is changed 
into blister by oxidizing iron and sulphur contained 
within the matte. The blister copper contains about 99% 
Copper. The blister copper is transferred to one of two 
250 ton reverberatory furnaces. At this point, the major 
impurity, oxygen, is removed by burning green hardwood 
logs in the mixture. The next step in the process is to 
transfer the material to the casting line. The anode 
grade copper is placed first into a five ton holding 
furnace. From there it can be transferred to the 
Hazelette Caster which is capable of producing the 640 
pound anodes at a rate of 42 tons per hour.
The last step in the process is to transfer the 
anodes to the refinery. The anodes are placed into one of 
278 production cells, each of which holds approximately 18 
tons of copper. The cells contain a solution of acidic 
copper sulfate. In a 21 day cycle, the anodes are 
electrically charged with 25,000 amperes. They dissolve
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into the solution and pure copper plates out onto inert 
stainless steel plates in the form of cathodes. A 
byproduct is produced in the form of a slime containing 
silver, gold and selenium.
The above descriptions of the ore processing 
sequence were provided by Copper Range Company. A more 
complete description of the milling, smelting and refining 
process is available in Appendix B.
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COMPARISON OF THE "OLD" AND THE "NEW" COPPER RANGE
It has been a little more than three years since the 
White Pine Mine was saved from closure and reopened under 
a new organizational structure. It has been three years 
of hard work and "cooperative" effort on the part of the 
employees/owners of the new company. There has also been 
a lot of waiting to see if their efforts are really going 
to pay off in the long run.
The operating philosophy presented in the introduc­
tion of this paper confers some very realistic goals on 
the part of the new company. However, it placed a tremen­
dous burden of responsibility on the part of all those 
involved to make Russ Wood's dream a reality. It would 
take more than words on paper to make the operation a 
success.
One major question which must be asked is, "How has 
the new company performed in comparison to the old one." 
That question will be addressed in the following pages. 
Selected performance parameters and aspects of the 
operation prior to the shut down will be compared to those 
of the current operation. These parameters are intended 
to show some significant changes that have taken place in 
the operation since reorganizing.
The information reviewed in this section was 
provided primarily by Copper Range Company. It originated
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from a variety of sources : reports, memos, and company
publications. In some cases, data on the previous 
operation was not readily available. Some of it was 
discarded when the mine reopened. Much of the data were 
stored on an IBM computer. The tapes for it are still 
available. Unfortunately, the computer left the property 
when Echo Bay did. Hence, the information is not 
readily obtainable. Despite these inconveniences, enough 
data were available to construct a valid, representative 
picture of the conditions that existed at the White Pine 
operation at the time of its closure and in the years 
leading up to it.
Organizational Structure
As we begin to examine the changes which have 
occurred at Copper Range over the past three years, let us 
first look at the change in its organizational structure.
The Copper Range of the past had a very detailed 
organizational structure chart. During a recent visit to 
the White Pine facilities, only one copy of the chart 
could be located. The company requested that it not be 
used in this report because of company policy.
The old organizational chart was a very tall, wide 
structure. It contained one box for each salaried person 
in the company (approximately 580 at one time), and inclu-
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ded all line and staff positions. Prior to the mine's
shut down in 1983, O.E. 11 Andy” Anderson was reported by
Copper Range representative Larry Chabot to have had 14
people reporting to him directly. The copy that was found
was nearly thirty-two pages long.
By comparison, the new Copper Range Company does not
have an official organizational structure chart. This is
a pretty dramatic change considering they used to put such
a high priority on it. This is not to say that they do
not have an organizational structure. However, they feel
that their present structure is a very flexible one, and
they do not want to confine people by "stereotyping" them.
In an interview with Copper Range Public Relations
Director Larry Chabot, he summarized the reasons for the
lack of a chart.
[The] lack of an organizational chart is a sign 
of health. It indicates that you are focusing 
on something else besides the mechanics of a 
reporting system. If a person is obsessed with 
line and staff positions, he will tend to go up 
the chart to solve a problem.... If he is not 
limited by an organizational chart, he will tend 
to go across his level to solve a problem....
[This] encourages direct dealing. Copper Range 
feels that it is not beneficial to have that 
sort of rigid structure in an employee owned 
company.
Figure 10 is an example of how the company has 
eliminated some of the structural layers within the 
company. This is an example depicting the layers in the 































FIGURE 10: COPPER RANGE HIERARCHY
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unit operations. However, similar structures exist in 
other parts of the company. The left half of the figure 
shows the number of layers that existed before the mine 
shut down. There are nine levels between a section helper 
(the lowest job class in the mine) and the chief executive 
officer of the company. The right half of the figure 
shows the number of layers that exist today. There are 
only six levels between those two respective points. The 
company has managed to eliminate three levels of 
management, two of them below the level of production 
superintendent.
Eliminating these three levels has been very benefi­
cial to the company in getting restarted. Personal obser­
vation can relate the fact that many hourly employees feel 
that there is a more equitable balance between the number 
of managers and hourly people in the company. There are 
not a lot of extra managers or "blue hats” as they are 
called in the mine (because of their blue hard hat desig­
nating a supervisor standing around, watching them work).
Eliminating these various levels was intended to 
accomplish several goals, the first of which was to make 
the operation run more efficiently. If it is true that as 
an organization becomes taller it becomes less efficient, 
then it must also be true that if an organization becomes 
shorter, it must become more efficient. The second reason
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for this would be to promote the idea that the company is 
a participatory organization. Eliminating management 
levels gives the employees a sense that they have a better 
means of direct contact with the other levels. A laborer 
in the mine need only climb up two levels to shift boss or 
three levels to production superintendent to discuss a 
problem. Before he would have had to climb five levels to 
reach the production superintendent.
Union Management Relationship
In order for the new company to be a success, one 
thing that had to change above all else is the relation­
ship between the management and the union. There was a 
lot of room for improvement. Great strides have been 
made. This is a crucial factor in helping the company to 
survive. «
Problems between the union and the management go 
back almost as far as the beginning of the operation.
Mike Dunn, Vice President of the company, indicated that 
there was a "bad history of labor relations on both sides 
of the fence at White Pine." This poor relationship is 
well documented too. When the problems between the two 
sides came to a boil, it usually resulted in one thing: a
strike. In an inter-office correspondence dated July 11, 
1979, William Born summarizes the "White Pine Copper
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Division History of Labor Disputes and Settlements.” The 
contents of that memo are listed in Table 2.
This list does not include the strike in 1980 which 
started August 1 and lasted for 67 days. Nor does it 
include the one in 1983, which officially had not ended 
when the mine was sold to Echo Bay. Including the last 
two, that is over two years spent in dispute with the 
union over labor negotiations. That represents about 7% 
of its history.
It is doubtful that any of the principals thought 
that the mine could be reopened without this relationship 
changing dramatically. In reality, it did change on the 
highest levels during the early days of the negotiations 
between Russ Wood and the union. However, changing the 
minds of the few would be a simple, although vital, task 
compared to changing the attitudes of the nearly 1,000 
people who were to follow. It would certainly not happen 
overnight and it was not going to be easy. Larry Snyder, 
Copper Range Director of Safety and Environmental Affairs, 
phrased it well in an interview in the "Governor's Office 
of Job Training: Job Training News." He said, "what
we're doing is attempting to reverse 30 years of history 




WHITE PINE COPPER DIVISION HISTORY OF LABOR 
DISPUTES AND SETTLEMENTS
# Davs
(10) July 5 through July 14, 1954 Strike - Contract
(9) Aug. 3 through Aug. 11, 1954 Strike - Contractors
(1) August 26, 1955 Wildcat
(4) Jan. 1 through Jan. 4, 1956 Strike - Contract
(1) April 6, 1956 Wildcat
(2) May 28 through May 29, 1956 Wildcat
(1) July 20, 1956 Wildcat
(5) July 31 through Aug. 4, 1956 Wildcat
(35) Sept. 23 through Oct. 27, 1957 Strike - Contract
(118) Oct. 29, 1959 through Feb.
23, 1960 Strike - Contract
(49) Sept. 1 through Oct. 19, 1964 Strike - Contract
(176) Aug. 1, 1967 through Jan.
23, 1968 Strike - Contract
(55) Aug. 1 through Sept. 24, 1971 Strike - Contract
(18) Aug. 3 through Aug. 20, 1974 Strike - Contract
(15) Aug. 1 through Aug. 15, 1977 Strike - Contract
TOTAL:(499)
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Many things have changed at White Pine in respect to 
the way the employees work and think about their jobs and 
the company. This statement, and the ones to follow, are 
based on the author's personal observations. As a produc­
tion foreman, he had close interaction with both union and 
management personnel. Whether that attitude of coopera­
tion and participation will persist over time is difficult 
to say. If it does, or does not, and why will be discus­
sed in more detail later in the paper. For the moment, it 
will suffice to say that in the early days of the opera­
tion there were some very dramatic changes. Much of this 
initial enthusiasm and cooperative spirit was probably 
superficial in nature. It was brought on by the excite­
ment and anticipation of going back to work after so long 
a time of being off work. This is not to say that the 
employees were not sincere in their efforts. Their 
desires to change were probably genuine. The employees 
observed at White Pine do not give the impression that 
they are prone to representing themselves falsely. How­
ever, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to eradi­
cate so many years of detrimental behavior so quickly. 
Nevertheless, the attitudes were present, and that was a 
start. Perhaps eventually they would sink in deep enough 
to eliminate the old feelings of mistrust.
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For whatever reason, at least the new company had 
something with which it could work. James Borseth, 
president of the local union, summarized the situation by 
saying, "Now we do it differently. Instead of putting the 
gloves on we try to work it out" (Job Training News, April 
1987). This is true in the literal sense for there were 
numerous occasions when a situation was resolved which 
might have led to a confrontation in the past. The 
attitudes also changed on a figurative basis. There was a 
relaxation of many old work habits that prevented any sort 
of cooperative spirit from being fostered.
One way to relate this is from the point of view of 
a foreman working with a crew of men in the mine. The men 
that the author worked with related to him about the way 
things used to be. In the old days there was a very strict 
division of job classes. In the mine for instance, there 
were driller-blasters, scoop tram operators, shuttle car 
operators, dozer operators, section helpers, mechanics, 
parts runners, utility men, electricians, welders, and 
supervisors, just to name a few. The jobs were very spe­
cific, with each man doing his and his alone. For 
example, suppose a drilling jumbo were to break down. The 
sequence of events would have gone something like this.
The driller walks to the unit site and reports the damage 
to his foreman (if no foreman was present, he would wait).
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The foreman would call for a mechanic, who in turn, would 
send a parts runner to get what was necessary. Throughout 
all this, the foreman would wait and watch. He could not 
lift one finger to help.
Today that same driller would report to the unit 
and, if no foreman were around, would call the shop him­
self to request a mechanic and the part. In some cases 
the repair may be relatively minor, say for instance a 
hydraulic hose. In this case the driller, and his fore­
man, would attempt to fix the machine themselves. This 
would save time and prevent the mechanics from being 
called away from something else. Today it seems a good 
foreman is almost expected to possess a certain amount of 
clairvoyance so that when a jumbo did break down he could 
be standing right there with a part ready to fix it.
Workers were traditionally assigned to one piece of 
equipment for the entire shift. If a piece broke down, 
that operator would take it to the shop for repair. He 
would wait for as many hours as it took to fix it, all 
shift if necessary. Today paints a much different pic­
ture. A mobile equipment operator (trams, trucks, etc.) 
whose rig is broken down generally has three things on his 
mind. First, fix the machine if possible. This is done 
usually with the foreman's help, but sometimes without.
If the unit is not readily repairable, the next step is to
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find an immediate replacement. Spares are usually kept in 
each unit site, but sometimes it is necessary to go to 
other units and borrow one. If that is not possible, the 
last step is to attempt to get the rig repaired, either by 
taking it to the shop or by sending for a mechanic. Thus, 
the operator can return to the work force as soon as pos­
sible.
Sometimes these things are not possible, and even if . 
they are, it may well take several hours to do so, but at 
least the effort is there. In their quest to support the 
company, operators have been known to locate a new piece 
of equipment by calling around on the telephone (or ”Bitch 
Box" as it is called), travel to where it is located, 
hitchhiking with someone, and return to work without the 
foreman ever knowing there was a problem (foremen are 
often very busy and cannot be in all places at once con­
trary to popular opinion). Now, in the author's opinion, 
that takes a great deal of motivation on the part of the 
employee. He could just as easily wait for his foreman to 
return before taking any action.
There is another way to relate the fact that 
employees are, at least on the surface, reacting 
differently to their new company. Figure 11 shows the 
average number of third step grievances per month from 




























FIGURE 11: AVERAGE THIRD STEP GRIEVANCES PER 
MONTH FROM 1 9 7 0 -1 9 8 2
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"White Pine Indicators," which are presented in Appendix C 
of this paper. A third step grievance is one which must 
go to arbitration to be settled. The graph shows that, 
with the exception of two very bad years in 1970 and 1971, 
they averaged around 3.2 grievances per month. Figure 12 
shows the average number of third step grievances per 
month for the period of 1986 to 1988. Two times should be 
discounted. The first is the early part of 1986 when so 
many people were returning to work. There was a great 
deal of confusion, and most new people had not been indoc­
trinated into the new philosophy of the operation. The 
second is a period from the middle to latter part of 1988. 
Following a major fall of ground in February, the company 
was thrust into a period of utter chaos. Within the mine, 
entire work areas dissolved and were moved. The increase 
in grievances from June to November reflect an equally 
traumatic phase when the operation was attempting to 
return to normal. Other than these two times, the new 
company has averaged only 0.78 grievances per month. This 
is significantly lower than the previous level and 
reflects a change in attitude of the work force. There 
are times when there are zero grievances for several 
months in a row. Perhaps they are trying to work things 


























FIGURE 12: THIRD STEP GRIEVANCES PER MONTH 
FROM 1 9 8 6 -1 9 8 8
ER-3708 49
Grade
There are many things which could contribute 
significantly to the success or failure of a new 
operation. The mining grade is one of them. Figure 13 
shows the average mill head grade per year from 1970 to 
the present. The historical information was obtained from 
the White Pine indicators. The White Pine indicators are 
presented in Appendix C. The current data were obtained 
from the Copper Range Report(s), a monthly newsletter put 
out by the company. The graph indicates that in this 
instance, the grade has not experienced a significant 
change from that of the previous operation. The slight 
decline in 1988 can be attributed to the fall of ground 
which occurred in February. This forced the company to 
move its mining activities to another location in the mine 
where the average grade is lower. The grade has improved 
since they have been returning their operations to the 
southwest area.
In this case, the grade has helped the operation 
from several aspects. First it is a fairly decent grade. 
Secondly it is consistent. This helps in that it allows 
the geologists and mine planning personnel to make 
reliable, accurate predictions of what will be 
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FIGURE 13: AVERAGE MILL HEAD GRADE (L B /T O N ) 
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operation from the respect that it is not any better or 
worse than the previous operation.
Copper Price
Another factor which could greatly influence an 
operation is the price of the commodity you are trying to 
sell. The amount for which copper is selling on a per 
pound basis can mean the difference between success and 
failure. For the old company, it meant failure. Table 3 
shows the average monthly copper price on the COMEX 
(Commodities Exchange) Market. Copper Range sells the 
majority of its product through futures contracts based on 
the COMEX price. This information was provided by the 
company. It is easier to comprehend if it is put into 
graph form. Figure 14 shows the average monthly COMEX 
Copper price for 1970-1988. When the mine was 
experiencing problems in 1982 and 1983, it was due in part 
to the copper price. In June of 1982, copper was selling 
for less than half of what it had been in January of 1980. 
This is a significant drop and undoubtedly contributed to 
the death of the operation.
Unfortunately, when the mine reopened in the latter 
part of 1985, the new company did not have the benefit of 
a prosperous copper market. Prices had been in the 60-65 
cents/pound range since the last quarter of 1984. It 
would inevitably stay there until May of 1987. Only after
ER-3708 52
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FIGURE 14: MONTHLY COMEX COPPER PRICE ($ /L B )  
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this time did the price of copper experience any 
significant increase. The firming of the price since mid- 
1987 has made things a lot easier on the company in some 
regards.
Persistently low copper prices during the first part 
of Copper Range's life made things very difficult for the 
new company. With all of the other factors to be con­
sidered —  production, equipment, employee attitudes and 
so on —  not being able to sell your finished product for 
more than a few cents above your cost did not make matters 
any easier.
Employees
One of the basic concepts that enabled Russ Wood to 
”dream” his dream is that of doing more with less. The 
less part of that equation centers primarily with the 
number of employees who work at the operation.
The White Pine Mine has traditionally been a very 
big operation. It would have had to be in order to grow 
to the proportions described earlier. Figure 15 shows the 
average number of employees per month on a yearly basis 
from 1970 to 1982. The information was obtained from the 
White Pine Indicators. The company maintained high 
manning levels through the middle 1970s. They reached 
their peak in 1974 at 3,029 employees. At this point, it 
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FIGURE 15: AVERAGE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES 
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too big and fat for its own good. Shortly after that, 
they began a streamlining operation by reducing the size 
of their workforce. The company reduced its labor force 
by nearly one-half in 1976 as compared to 1975. Over the 
next six years the manning levels would fluctuate up and 
down. These fluctuations correspond to the fluctuations 
in the production levels.
The situation for the last three years has been 
considerably different. Figure 16 shows the average 
number of employees per month from 1986-1988. The 
information was obtained from the Copper Range Reports.
The steep rise in the first half of 1986 is brought on by 
the initial hiring phase. Employees were hired quickly 
because of their high degree of expertise and the lack of 
any need of any real great amount of on-the-job training. 
After the initial surge, the manning levels began to 
settle out at approximately 930. Only in the past few 
months has there been any significant increase. There are 
more employees being hired on as operations begin to 
return to normal after the fall of ground in February 
1988.
Throughout this period, there have been only a few 
months where the number decreased. This is due to the 
inevitable firings, retirings, and employees who choose to 
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1988 is 0.3%. The turnover rate from 1968 to 1982 was 
1.3%. There have been no layoffs since the operation 
began.
The number of employees that the company may employ 
is a very strictly controlled number. This is due 
primarily to the emloyee ownership concept on which the 
company is founded. Only a certain number of people are 
allowed to be owners and participate in the employee stock 
ownership program.
The White Pine Mine draws its labor force from seven 
counties surrounding it. Figure 17 shows all of the coun­
ties where Copper Range Employees reside. Almost half of 
the employes reside in Ontonagon County, Michigan. How­
ever, one employee travels from as far away as Crystal 
Falls. The average commuting distance for non-residents 
is 84 miles. A complete breakdown of the geographical 
distribution of the employees is presented in Appendix D.
The author has experienced several thousand hours of 
close interaction with the workers at White Pine on both a 
professional and personal level. At times the relation­
ship was so close that it was difficult to distinguish 
between worker and supervisor. On the basis of that fact, 
it is relatively safe to say that the men who work at 
White Pine are very good at what they do. Although most 
of the hourly workers encountered lack any formal educa-
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FIGURE 17: GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF WORKFORCE
SOURCE: COPPER RANGE COMPANY
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tion beyond high school, they are ••professionals” as much 
as many lawyers, doctors, or engineers. Most of them have 
had many years' experience perfecting their skills. They 
went to work in the early seventies as the company was 
building to its peak manning levels.
Production Levels
In order for the operation to be a success, you have 
to produce more copper with the employees you have.
Copper Range has succeeded in reducing the number of 
employees. How have they done with regard to producing 
more copper?
Figure 18 shows the average monthly production for 
the years 1970-1982. The data were gathered from the 
White Pine Indicators. The graph shows there was a 
significant drop in the monthly production in 1976. This 
corresponds to the layoff of some 1,300 employees. After 
this the production levels out at approximately 275,000 
tons per month, rising and falling along with the number 
of employees.
Figure 19 shows the monthly production from 1986 to 
1988. The information was obtained from the Copper Range 
Reports. Production started quickly and rose quickly in 
the early part of 1986. It is difficult to say when they 
reached their peak levels. Fluctuations from month to 
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FIGURE 18: AVERAGE PRODUCTION (TONS/MONTH x 1000) 
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FIGURE 19: MONTHLY PRODUCTION (TONS x 1000) 
FROM 1 9 8 6 -1 9 8 8
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equipment problems, holidays, vacations and hunting 
seasons (this might not be a major consideration in some 
areas, but you had better believe it is at White Pine). 
Some of this seasonal fluctuation can be eliminated by 
looking at the statistics on a quarterly average basis. 
This is included in Figure 19. As can be seen, Copper 
Range's Average quarterly production per month rises 
steadily from the time of startup. It peaks out at 
approximately 400,000 tons per month. Production drops 
sharply following the cave-in, but again rises steadily 
and was approaching its former levels at the time of this 
report.
At its peak levels of 400,000 tons per month, Copper 
Range was operating with approximately 930 employees.
This is substantially higher than the 280,592 tons per 
month produced in 1975 with 1,500 employees. It would 
appear that Copper Range has succeeded in producing "more 
with less."
Productivity
Most modern mining operations keep some sort of 
statistics on the productivity of their employees. Copper 
Range is no different. Historically, productivity was 
calculated in terms of tons per manshift (tons/ms). This 
information was recorded, among other places, on the White 
Pine Indicators.
«wSS % * » * ,  
oou>™.
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Figure 20 shows the yearly average productivity in 
tons/ms from 1970 to 1982. The White Pine operation was 
able to make significant increases in its productivity 
over that thirteen year period. Going from 44.2 tons/ms 
to 77 tons/ms is an incrase of 74%. Despite all of Copper 
Range's problems during this period, it is noteworthy that 
the management had the foresight to improve productivity.
All by itself, the productivity gains presented in 
Figure 20 are quite impressive. In August of 1981, 
management reached its all time productivity high of 80.4 
tons/ms. This was such a cause for celebration that it 
had a special belt buckle commissioned by the Anacortes 
Brass Works Ltd. of Anacortes, Washington (see Figure 21).
Fortunately, the company's old productivity record 
does not look very impressive when compared to the new 
productivity statistics. Figure 22 shows the quarterly 
average productivity in tons/ms for 1986 to 1988. Month 
to month productivity records experience the same sort of 
fluctuations as were mentioned for the production 
statistics. Therefore, quarterly averages were used to 
help smooth out some of the bumps and give a more 
representative figure. The information is kept on a daily 
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FIGURE 20: AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY (TONS/MANSHIFT) 
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nvfTY RECORD
FIGURE 21. COPPER RANGE COMPANY PRODUCTIVITY RECORD 
COMMEMORATIVE BELT BUCKLE
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Figure 22 shows that Copper Range experienced 
dramatic increases in productivity from the very start of 
the operation. A productivity rate of 108 tons/ms is 
considerably better compared to the all time high of 80.4 
tons/ms ; and it is even more impressive when one considers 
that they were just getting started. The rating drops 
slightly over the remainder of the year as manning 
approached its peak level ? and the operation worked out 
the rest of the bugs associated with startup. 1987 
experienced consistently high productivity in the range of
103 to 108 tons/ms. The same is true for the first
quarter of 1988. There is no productivity recorded for 
the second quarter of 1988. The cave-in that occurred in 
February threw the operation into such turmoil that 
calculating productivity statistics probably seemed 
pointless. At the moment, they were simply trying to 
survive. As the operation began to return to normal in 
the third and fourth quarters, the productivity rating 
began to increase to its previous levels. It is of
special interest to note that during all of this time, the
recorded productivity has been higher than the previous 
operation's all-time productivity record.
Another form of productivity that Copper Range is 
beginning to calculate is the Tons of Marketable Copper 





























FIGURE 22: QUARTERLY PRODUCTIVITY (TONS/MANSHIFT) 
FROM 1 9 8 6 -1 9 8 8
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the period of 1970 to 1982, but enough information was 
available from the White Pine Indicators to calculate it. 
Figure 23 shows the tons of marketable copper per employee 
per year for 1970 to 1988. The company experienced steady 
increases through the 1970,s and a slight decrease in the 
early 1980/s. In 1986, the new company produced slightly 
more tons per employee than the previous operation had. 
This is significant considering that the smelter and 
refinery were in operation for only about half of the 
year. 1987 is a more representative figure of what the 
company considers to be its true potential. In future 
years they hope to increase that even more. 1988 is not a 
representative year either because the cave-in disrupted 
the flow of copper so badly. It may be difficult to 
envision an upward trend using so few data points, but if 
they did it once, there is no reason to suspect that they 
will not be able to do it again. Their other increases in 
productivity in tons/ms suggest that they should be able 
to do it.
Wages and Compensation
One thing that has a very dramatic impact on any 
operation is the wages paid to its employees. This factor 
played a very important role in the destruction of the 
previous company. Figure 24 is a copy of a graph produced 
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FIGURE 23: MARKETABLE COPPER PRODUCED (TONS) 
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FIGURE 24: BASIC WAGE PLUS C.O.L.A. 
FROM 1 9 7 2 -1 9 8 5
ER-3708 72
living adjustment from 1972 to 1984. As can be seen,
there have been some very dramatic increases. The base
wage increased from a little over $4 per hour to $7.17 per
hour in a twelve year period. The cost of living
adjustment increased by $5.64 over the same period. This
resulted in an increase of 212% for the total. The
average wage at the time of the shut down was
approximately $12.81 plus fringe benefits.
The company claimed that it was these increases,
coupled with drastically low copper prices that were
forcing them out of business in 1982-83. That was one of
the reasons that they requested concessions from the union
in the 1983 contract talks. Unfortunately, the union did
not consider the wages paid to its employees to play any
part in the problems experienced by the company. In a
resolution adopted May 11, 1982 by the National Nonferrous
Coordinated Bargaining Committee, entitled Addressing the
Concern of the Unions About the Current Economic
Depressing in the Copper Industry, they stated:
We are, after all, primarily committed to the 
preservation of jobs for our members and making 
their employment secure. But the underlying 
reasons for the depression in copper are in no 
way related to the level of remuneration paid 
workers in accordance to the contracts 
negotiated by our unions.
It is probably true that not all of the company's economic
woes were caused by the wages, but there can be no doubt
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that they were a contributing factor. It was very 
irresponsible for them to believe that they were totally 
unresponsible in any way. The company had experienced 48 
COLA increases over the twelve year period. Larry Chabot, 
Public Relations Director for Copper Range considers the 
COLA to be a cyclic, or Catch-22 effect (Heller, Joseph, 
1955). He states that MCOLA was a Catch-22 effect. You 
need a COLA, this drives up inflation, so you [eventually] 
need another COLA.”
The union did agree to accept the contract accepted 
by other parts of the industry. This included a freeze in 
the base wage. This is depicted as the horizontal line in 
Figure 24 at $7.17/hour. They apparently considered this 
to be a very generous contribution on their behalf. Con­
sidering the magnitude of the Cost of Living Adjustment by 
that time, and the price of copper, it probably wouldn't 
have made that much of an impact on the problems experi­
enced by the company.
The wage scale for the present company is a much 
simpler system to understand. It was set up in the terms 
of the contract negotiated with the union. There are 
nineteen job classes whose wage (not including fringe 
benefits) range from approximately $6.50/hour to 
$9.38/hour. The average wage is $8.50/hour. The contract 
calls for an adjustment of the pay rates every six months
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so that the average remains at $8.50/hour. There is no 
cost of living adjustment. This wage offer caused quite a 
bit of controversy when it was first proposed since it was 
nearly $4.00/hour less than the average employee was 
making before. Many of them initially considered it to be 
a grave insult. However, most of them quickly managed to 
see the light when they realized that it was this or 
nothing. Russ Wood summed it up very well when he said, 
"This is not a cut in pay from $12 to $8. It is an 
increase in pay of $8, compared to $0 they have been 
making for the last three years" (Franklin, Never Say Die, 
January 1986).
Personal experience can testify to the fact that the 
new Copper Range Company does pay below industry stan­
dards, but it compensates its employees in other forms 
based on their productivity, profitability and perfor­
mance. The compensation plan is divided into three parts: 
Incentive Pay, Employee Stock Ownership, and Profit 
Sharing. Each of them will be discussed in brief.
The Copper Range Incentive Plan is basically tied 
into the productivity of the employees. The employees are 
divided into six groups, with approximately 150 in each. 
They are:




o Processing (Mill Smelter Refinery) 
o Plant Maintenance and Services 
o Power and Staff Services
The incentive plan includes every employee except 
the president and vice president(s). There is a minimum 
incentive of $0.50/hour paid all of the time as was 
negotiated in the contract. Additional amounts above this 
minimum are paid to each group if their calculated 
productivity pay exceeds the minimum. Calculating the 
incentive pay is where things start to get a little 
tricky. Incentives for each group are earned from three 
areas. They are:
o Operating at higher safety levels 
o More copper produced per person 
o Savings in materials used 
A description of how these factors are calculated, along 
with a more detailed explanation of the incentive plan, is 
included in Appendix E.
The program is designed to give each person the 
opportunity to increase their earnings by working harder, 
safer, and by saving materials. There are problems with 
it. As a former participant of this program, the author 
is well aware of the benefits and pitfalls associated with 
it. One of the biggest problems observed to date is the
ER-3708 76
fact that it is far too complicated for the average 
employee to understand. The concept is clear enough, but 
the implementation of it escapes most people. When incen­
tives were first received by employees in excess of the 
minimum there was a great deal of confusion as to why one 
group would earn only the minimum, while another group 
would earn considerably more. Both groups were full of 
people who were working hard, trying to be safe, and try­
ing to save materials. What was intended to be a great 
morale booster turned out to be a morale lowerer.
The Copper Range Profit Sharing Plan is tied into 
the Incentive Plan. It is fairly simple. When the 
company experiences gains (profit) from operations, it is 
supposed to pay out 30% of them to the employees. The 
other 70% will be returned to the company. Copper Range 
had a net loss in each fiscal period during 1986 and 1987. 
Hence there was no profit sharing during those times.
Had they found themselves in a profitable situation, 
paying out dividends (profit sharing) would not be as easy 
as simply writing checks. Under the provision of the loan 
agreement with Echo Bay, Copper Range is prohibited from 
distributing profit payments to the employees without 
their consent. Echo Bay cannot refuse a request to pay 
dividends if the company has serviced its debt and is in a 
sound financial position.
ER-3708 77
The early part of 1988 did not look as though it 
would be a profitable year either. This was due to the 
fall of ground mentioned earlier. However, as a result of 
the hard work of the employees and the higher copper 
price, the company was able to generate a profit in 1988.
In the latter part of 1988, Copper Range secured a $40
million loan from the Chemical Bank of New York. They 
used part of these funds to retire the debt they incurred 
at start-up, including the Echo Bay loan. As a result, 
for the first time in the company's short life, they found 
themselves in a position to distribute profits. One 
million dollars was distributed in the form of a $1,000 
payment to each employee.
The last part of the compensation plan is the 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). This is the concept 
on which the entire company was founded. Give the 
employees a stake in the mine by making them part owners.
The plan is designed to reward employees who work in 
excess of 870 hours in a calendar year. After an employee 
completes his first calendar year, he is eligible for 
stock for any year in which he is still a participant and
completes at least one hour of service.
Each year, each employee will be granted a 
percentage of the shares available based on his earnings. 
The maximum earning which is considered is $19,000 per
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year. A person's share is determined as the percentage of 
his earnings to those of all other ESOP participants (see 
example 1 in the ESOP summary in Appendix E for 
clarification).
Over the five year contract, each employee who was 
an ESOP participant for that period is expected to earn 
approximately 700 shares. The first year, 1985, each 
employee of the new company received one token share 
valued at $9.00. The next year, the accounting firm of 
Coopers & Lybrand valued the shares of Copper Range stock 
at $24.40 each. In 1987, the shares were valued at $54.11 
per share by Coopers & Lybrand.
Under the ESOP plan, each employee is given voting 
rights for his or her shares in the company. If no shares 
of Copper Range stock are listed with the Securities 
Exchange Commission prior to November 7, 1990 (i.e., 
publicly-traded), all shares of the ESOP are voted by 
proxy through the trustee of the plan, the First American 
Bank of Detroit. This is with the exception of the 
election of the Board of Directors, which the trustee may 
vote without the proxy of the ESOP members.
The Board of Directors is designed to have seven 
members. Under Article 11 of the company's Certificate of 
Incorporation, the Board of Directors is to be elected 
from nominees based on the following categories :
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o Two persons designated by the chief executive 
officer of the company, 
o Two persons designated by the United Steel 
Workers of America (the collective bargaining 
agent).
o One person designated by the non-collective 
bargaining employees, 
o Two persons designated by the State of Michigan. 
These provisions are designated to assure that there 
will be a continuity of the members and to further assure 
that certain parties will continue to have representation 
on the Board.
At the moment there is no market for the shares. An 
employee must wait until after 1991 to receive compensa­
tion for his share in the company. There are certain 
instances where they may receive the compensation earlier. 
In general, however, they will simply have to wait. How­
ever, if the trend in rising stock valuation continues as 
it has in the past, it might be well worth it.
Safety Statistics
How has the company performed as far as becoming a 
safer place to work is concerned? The accident frequency 
rate was examined to see if there had been any significant 
drop.
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The historical accident frequency rate was available 
from White Pine Indicators. However, those were 
calculated on the basis of 1,000,000 man hours, and would 
have to be recalculated on the basis of 200,000 man hours. 
Information was collected from company reports on safety 
and manning from 1974 to 1983. The accident frequency 
rate was then calculated based on the formula:
Frequency # days lost x 200,000Rate = _______________________
Per month Man hours
The current frequency rate was collected from the 
Copper Range Company Injury/Illness Reports. Both sets of 
statistics were averaged on a yearly basis and plotted in 
Figure 25. The graph shows that the White Pine Mine 
experienced some extremely high incident rates during the 
middle 1970s. After that, it drops back down to more 
respectable levels for the next six years. During that 
period it averaged 34 lost time accidents per 200,000 man 
hours. The last two years of the operation experienced 
another explosion in the frequency rate. This was 
probably the result of the labor problems experienced in 
1982 and 1983. There was no information available for 
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FIGURE 25: AVERAGE ACCIDENT FREQUENCY RATE 
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Upon returning to operation in 1986, the facility 
experienced a substantial drop in the frequency rate. In 
the three years of operation, it has averaged only 7.6, 
and has not risen above 15.0.
Production Costs
All of the efforts and achievements discussed up to 
now would be irrelevant if it still cost more to make 
the product than for which it can be sold. This is 
exactly the situation in which the company found itself in 
1983.
We have already seen what happened to the price of 
copper in the years leading up to the closure. It 
experienced a steady drop from 1980 through 1982. It rose 
slightly in 1983 into the $0.70 per pound range, but 
dropped later that year into the $0.60 per pound range.
It would not rise above $0.70 per pound for nearly three 
and one-half years.
This would not have been bad if the production costs 
had dropped correspondingly. Unfortunately, that was not 
the case for Copper Range. Figure 26 shows the average 
production costs ($/lb.) from 1978 to 1984. The 
information was obtained from a report by Stearns 
Catalytic entitled "Cost of Sales Estimates for Operation 
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FIGURE 26: AVERAGE PRODUCTION COSTS ($ /L B )  
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There is a dramatic increase in the production cost from 
1978 to 1984. The result is that it almost doubles in a 
seven year period. With copper prices dropping as they 
were, it is of little surprise that the company found 
itself in financial trouble and considering various 
alternatives including concessions from the union, 
cutbacks, and closure of the property.
The second part of the graph represents production 
cost for the new operation. They are in the form of cost 
per cathode equivalent which is equal to:
Production cost/(pounds of Copper in Concentrator
produced in a month) * .95
Although this is a slightly different form than the one 
used before, they are equivalent for the purposes of 
comparison. For the year of 1986, the production cost 
averaged $0.63/cathode equivalent. In 1987, the cost had 
dropped to an average of $0.60/cathode equivalent. There 
were no cost figures available for 1988. Copper Range 
felt that it was such a bastard year that the cost figures 
would not be representative of the true nature of the 
operation. Had it not been for the cave-in, it is 
probably safe to say that the production cost for 1988 
would have been in the neighborhood of $0.60/cathode 
equivalent. So the cost appears to be stabilizing at 
approximately the levels they were in 1978.
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INFLUENCING FACTORS
It is the purpose of this paper, in addition to 
reviewing the history and regeneration, to attempt to 
isolate and discuss some of the factors which have 
affected the development of the Copper Range Company.
There are undoubtedly many. Some of them have acted as a 
catalyst to help the company get started, and others have 
acted only to hinder it. It would be impractical, if not 
impossible, to list all of them. For now we will limit 
ourselve to those which are considered to be of major 
importance. Many of these factors and problems 
experienced by the company to be discussed later border on 
the study of individual and group psychology. A true 
study in psychology would require much more extensive 
research in that area. This would be beyond the 
abilities of the author and the scope of this paper. For
now it will suffice that we discuss various possibilities. 
Some of the ideas presented herein are a matter of opinion 
based upon personal observations, experiences and 
interviews. They are not necessarily substantiated by any 
scientifically accepted theories.
The factors which have affected the company's regen­
eration will be split into two types for discussion. One
is "internal" factors, or those over which they had a good
deal of control. The other is "external," or those over
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which the company did not have a great deal of control. 
External will be discussed first.
Economic Conditions in the Upper Peninsula
Probably the most predominant external factor which 
has acted as a catalyst for the reopening of the mine 
concerns the unemployment rate in the area. Figure 27 
shows the unemployment rate for Ontonagon County, Michigan 
versus the national average. These numbers were provided 
by the Michigan Employment Securities Commission.
Ontonagon County is where the mine is located and from 
where they draw almost 50% of their work force. The rate 
has traditionally been higher there than the national 
average. In 1982, it started to climb to a rate such that
in early 1983, it was nearly 4.5 times the national aver­
age. Conditions such as these could only be described as 
extremely bad. The rate dropped significantly over the 
next three years, but was still in the range of 20-28% 
(which was three times the national average) at the time 
the mine reopened. Sending 900 people back to work had a 
significant impact in this area as was seen in 1986 when
the rate dropped from 19% to about 7%. The rise in 1987
was caused by other industries in the area experiencing 
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FIGURE 27: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE ( * )  IN ONTONAGON 
COUNTY MICHIGAN FROM 1 9 7 9 -1 9 8 8  VS. NATIONAL
AVERAGE
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High unemployment rates in the area were not 
isolated to Ontonagon County, although they did experience 
the extremes. Gogebic County experienced unemployment as 
high as 22.4% in the middle part of 1984. Houghton County 
saw rates in the range of 16% during the same time. 
However, there can be no doubt that reopening the mine had 
its greatest effect in Ontonagon County. Of the 960 
employees, approximately 1/2 live in Ontonagon. This 
represents approximately 14% of their civilian labor force 
of 3,500 people.
Economic Impact
The economic effects of reopening the mine can be 
seen in other ways besides how many people it sent back to 
work. It is obvious that employing more people generates 
revenue in the form of payrolls. It also is responsible 
for a reverse cash flow. Where you once had money flowing 
out of the state coffers in the form of welfare and 
unemployment assistance, you now have money flowing into 
the state in the form of income taxes.
From a pamphlet entitled "Economic Impact of 
theCopper Range Operation," the company illustrates the 
effects of reopening. They pumped $15 million into the 
local economy in the form of payroll in the first year.
In an address to the Ontonagon Chamber of Commerce on May 
13, 1986, Russ Wood summarized this impact by saying, "The
RRTHUR LAKES UBRAAÏ 
COLORADO SCHOOL of MINES 
GOLDEN, COLORADO 80401
ER-3708 89
impact on an individual can be enormous. Instead of being 
unemployed or underemployed, there are soul satisfying 
effects of a regular job and a regular paycheck of decent 
money. [There is] the pride of having a job, the 
challenge of work.”
In addition to the individual aspects, Wood made
several predictions of what creating 800 new jobs would do
to the local economy. They included:
o retail sales increase by over $7 million/year 
o bank deposits increase by almost $7 million/year
o school populations increase by over 570
o eight more retail establishments open their 
doors.
To date, not all of Russ Wood's predictions have come 
true. However, it is obvious to an observer that reopen­
ing the mine had a very dramatic effect on the local econ­
omy and its residents. This may have helped to foster the 
success of the operation.
The Hierarchy of Needs
One effect of the high unemployment and poor local 
economy on the residents of the area can be illustrated 
through Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. Figure 28 shows that 
hierarchy. At the bottom of the scale are physiological 













FIGURE 28: MASLOW'S HIERARCHY OF NEEDS
SOURCE: HODGETTS, R. MANAGEMENT
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The next step up are the safety needs. These include the 
need to protect oneself from harm, having enough money to 
provide for the physiological needs, and a "desire for an 
orderly, predictable environment" (Hodgetts, Management, 
p. 473). The other three levels are social needs, esteem 
and self-actualization. The idea behind Maslow's 
Hierarchy is that each subsequent need starts to become 
important to an individual after the ones below it have 
been satisfied. In this report, only the bottom two are 
of any real importance. These could be referred to as the 
survival needs. The men and women who made their living 
at White Pine had been existing in a survival mode for 
several years. Although they were not actually referring 
to this particular aspect, many employees encountered 
described the few years prior to start-up as simply survi­
ving. They detailed the variety of jobs they performed in 
order to survive. Everything from working minimum wage 
jobs to living off the land. The opportunity to return to 
work at the mine was viewed by most to be a lifesaver. It 
would give them an opportunity to start living again, 
instead of simply surviving. Perhaps the results might 
have been different if, when the recall for employment 
came, these people were engaged in a variety of lucrative, 
secure positions. However, the author observed that these 
types of positions were not readily available? so they
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were thoroughly motivated to return to White Pine and give 
it their best effort.
There was another very curious phenomenon observed 
while at the operation. Despite the terrible economic 
conditions that existed, many of the employees chose not 
to leave the area in search of any permanent employment.
Of those who did leave, many chose to return at the earli­
est possible moment. This can be related back to Maslow's 
Hierarchy of Needs. The last two levels might also be 
referred to as the "security" needs. As was stated 
earlier, part of the safety need is satisfied by an order­
ly, predictable environment. They were managing to ful­
fill their physiological needs (food, clothing, shelter). 
The combination of these two factors satisfied their 
security needs. As long as it was, many of the employees 
appeared to be more comfortable staying exactly where they 
were.
As part of this security need, there are a number of 
factors which might have contributed to their desire to 
stay. These are a matter of the author's opinion based on 
personal observations and interviews.
One factor would be termed the geographic favoritism 
to the Upper Peninsula. As was described earlier, the 
area is a fairly isolated one. It is rugged, wooded ter­
rain which is abundant with wild game. The population is
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sparsely distributed. These factors lend themselves well 
to a certain ”outdoor” lifestyle which might not be found 
elsewhere. In addition, the area lacks many of the as­
pects associated with a larger city such as pollution, 
crime, overcrowding, traffic, and so on. The people of 
this area might have chosen to endure the economic hard­
ships in order to preserve this lifestyle.
Another factor which could be considered is the 
cultural unity of the workforce. Many of the people share 
a common heritage. Early settlers of this area came pri­
marily from a Scandinavian background, or more specifi­
cally from Finland. This heritage is reflected back in 
the names, customs, food and, to a certain extent, the 
language encountered in the area. The thought of moving 
into a totally new culture, foreign to one's own might be 
a strong enough deterrent to have kept some people from 
leaving the area.
In association with the aspect of cultural unity 
stems the fact that many of the employees were born in the 
general vicinity. Many of those met there lived within a 
very short distance of the town where they were born. 
Whereas some aspects of our modern society tend to be very 
nomadic, these people seem to be more stationary. Each of 
us has a basic desire to stay near friends and family, and 
the area that we consider to be home. It makes us feel
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comfortable and secure. Moving away from "home” can be a 
very difficult, even traumatic experience. Many of these 
people appear to have avoided that. The necessity to 
leave has not overcome the desire to stay.
Another reason for not leaving might be purely econ­
omic. Some people interviewed could not afford to leave. 
As the company prospered in the middle to late 70,s, 
people prospered too. Homes were bought and built. When 
the mine shut down, the prospects of selling a home were 
bleak. There were no buyers, and most people could not 
afford to simply walk away and leave everything they had 
built behind. The only other alternative was to sit and 
wait.
One other thing that should be taken into considera­
tion is the employment limitations of the work force.
This applies primarily, although not exclusively, to the 
hourly people. Some of those observed lacked any addi­
tional skills other than those of mining. They had worked 
in the mines for most of their adult lives. There are, of 
course, exceptions to this. Unfortunately, the plain 
truth of the matter is when the mine closed, many of the 
employees interviewed were not prepared to do anything 
else of any consequence. Some of them had little choice 
but to survive the best they could and wait.
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The last of these aspects to be described is a 
similarity factor. In their book. Organizational 
Behavior. Hodgetts and Altman relate that similarity is 
one reason why people join a group. It might also be a 
reason why people stay in a group. People like to 
associate with other people whom they consider to be the 
same as they are. According to the book, "research shows 
that other similar factors include personality, economic 
conditions, race, sex and perceived ability" (p. 143).
The workers from White Pine might have been content to 
stay where they were if they thought that everyone else 
was struggling and suffering just as much as they were. 
Somehow it does not seem quite so bad when you suffer as 
part of a group as opposed to an individual effort. It 
does not make you feel like so much of a martyr if all 
your friends are in the same boat as you are. As Hodgetts 
and Altman put it, "misery does indeed love company" 
(Organizational Behavior, p. 143).
Copper Price
One other external factor which should be pointed 
out is the price of copper. As was stated earlier, Copper 
Range did not enjoy the benefit of a bull copper market 
when the mine reopened. In fact, it was about as 
depressed as it had been for a number of years. Logi­
cally, this would make the start-up of the mine a very
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difficult proposition. However, in some sense, the low 
copper prices served as a catalyst and were beneficial to 
the company. In the early days of the operation and 
today, there was a lot of emphasis on cooperation, parti­
cipation, self-motivation, and efficiency. The low prices 
help to foster these attitudes. Everyone wanted desper­
ately to survive, and the margin for error was too thin to 
get comfortable with. This situation created a sense of 
urgency and finality. Management posted the daily COMEX 
copper price for all employees to see as they entered 
work. This gave the average worker something he or she 
could relate to and motivate themselves.
It would be interesting to see how successful the 
operation would have been had the copper price been higher 
at start-up. They might have made a lot more money had 
copper been selling at today's price for the last three 
years. The idea of employee ownership might have become 
more of a reality. However, had this been so, the 
employees would not have had to work nearly as hard as 
they did. They might not have developed any sense of 
teamwork and participation.
Employee Involvement Plan
Let us now examine some of the internal factors 
which have affected the regeneration of the company. The
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first, and probably most important, is its employee 
involvement plan. This plan is one of the foundations on 
which the rest of the company is built. In order for the 
operation to be a success, the employees had to become 
more involved in the day-to-day operation.
The plan was developed in early 1986 by top 
management and union officials known as the planning team. 
It was at that time that they introduced the operation 
philosophy presented in Figure 1. Within the plan they 
developed what they considered to be a comprehensive 
method of involving employees on all levels, and beginning 
to promote the ideas of cooperation and participation.
The overall objectives of the plan are to achieve the 
Joint Business and Relationship Objectives outlined below.
Joint Business Objectives:
1. Safe plant, objective of zero lost time 
accidents;
2. Optimize production levels and product quality in 
all phases;
3. Elimination of waste and the use of practical 
approaches ?
4. Costs - Among the 20% lowest cost producers in 
the United States, the lowest 50% worldwide, to 
have the most productive, highest paid workers 
and to efficiently use all resources available;
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5. Modernize the plant through capital investment;
6. Retire debt and begin profit sharing;
7. Less supervision as workers assume more 
responsiblity; and
8. Knowledgeable trainers who perform on-the-job 
training.
Joint Relationship Objectives:
1. Encourage, listen and implement good ideas 
through employee involvement, with employee 
involvement at all levels;
2. Establish and maintain effective communication 
channels on all objectives, maintain channels so 
all departments work together, and work 
consistently and act as one company;
3. Develop positive attitudes and harmonious 
relationships with both union and management 
committing to change and with all parties taking 
a fresh start and forgetting the past;
4. Establish common goals with employee 
participation with each employee being part of 
the solution;
5. Become responsible employees with pride and 
workmanship ; and
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6. To the extent possible, eliminate distinctions 
and treat people equally.
The plan subsequently outlines the expectations of 
each level of employee, the objectives for each level, and 
makes recommendations as to how it should be accomplished. 
It also outlines the communication system for the employee 
involvement program and measurement systems necessary to 
monitor the company's progress. Additionally it makes 
recommendations concerning changes to be made which 
support the new philosophy. This included some items as 
simple as putting names on hardhats and eliminating the 
routine check of lunchboxes. Unfortunately, it is not 
known if Copper Range's Employee Involvement Plan is based 
on some pre-existing scheme, or if they thought it up on 
their own.
Once the planning team had completed its plan, it 
was transferred to the implementation team to carry it 
out. This would be accomplished by delegating authority 
to a variety of subcommittees each of which would be 
responsible for one aspect of the plan. Those committees 
formed include:
o a training committee 
o a communication committee 
o a measurement committee 
o a workplace environment committee
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o a tour committee 
o an awards committee.
Based on personal observation, it would appear that 
the planning team did a good job in creating the Employee 
Involvement Plan. The successful implementation would 
require the cooperation of everyone involved.
Measuring the effectiveness of the employment 
involvement plan would be a difficult problem. Copper 
Range Company chose some of the same parameters we chose 
to look at in our comparison of the old and new opera­
tions. Under the heading of "Measurement Systems for Plan 
Objectives" in the Employee Involvement Plan, the company 
outlines those parameters which it feels to be representa­
tive of the plans' success. They are: 
o Production and Productivity 
o Safety Performance 
o Production Costs 
o Third Step Grievances
Considering these measurement systems chosen by the 
planning team, it would appear that the employee 
involvement plan has been successful. However, there are 
other questions which could be asked to better define the 
success or failure of the plan. Several ones might 
include:
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o How many of the employees are participating in 
the Employee Involvement Plan? 
o To what extent are they participating? 
o What have they contributed to the company?
These questions and others were asked in the form of ques­
tionnaires distributed through management to 100 Copper 
Range employees. Unfortunately, none of them were ever 
received back.
A similar survey was conducted by the industrial 
engineering department of the Copper Range Company. It is 
entitled "The Work Group Survey." A copy of the survey is 
included in Appendix F. A work group is composed of 
employees aassigned to a common area. They meet on a 
regular basis to address, discuss, and resolve problems 
associated with their work area. This concept is the 
foundation of the Employee Involvement Plan. From the 
results of the survey, there are apparently mixed feelings 
among the White Pine employees as to the effectiveness of 
employee involvement.
The third question on the survey asked: "Can Copper
Range succeed without employee involvement?" It is 
interesting to note that 80% of the employees feel that it 
cannot. This would tend to indicate that a large majority 
of employees support the concept of employee involvement.
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The first question in the survey asked: "Is [your]
work group effective?" Although a majority of both 
surface and underground employees believe that employee 
involvement is needed, they are not as unified in their 
opinions of the plan's effectiveness. A large majority of 
surface employees (76%) feel that their work group is 
effective. However, of the underground employees, only 
43% share that opinion. Of those underground employees 
who responded, 51% indicated that their work group was not 
effective, or that they did not know if it was. This 
would tend to indicate that there might be a serious prob­
lem with the underground communications, the implementation 
of the plan, or the way the underground employees perceive 
the concept.
Participatory Management
Intertwined into the fabric of the Employee 
Involvement Plan is the concept of participatory 
management. There are two management styles which need to 
be considered here: participatory and autocratic.
Autocratic is the style of management used under the 
old company. Autocracy is defined by the American Heri­
tage Dictionary of the English Language as "government by 
a single person having unlimited power" (Davies, 1976). 
Therefore, autocratic management could be defined as
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management, or rule, by a single person having unlimited 
power. This may seem to be a bit extreme, but the author 
has been told by numerous employees that this is the way 
that it was before the company was reorganized. The 
supervisor's word was law; and there was very little room, 
if any, for discussion. This applied in particular to 
those management personnel who were in a supervisory posi­
tion over union people. This sort of authoritarian system 
is what you would expect to see in a situation where the 
relationship between management and union was so poor, and 
there were many strict rules implemented to keep the 
workers in line. The boss told you what to do, where to 
do it, and possibly even how to do it. This militaristic 
system was deeply embedded in everyone's thought track and 
it manifested itself in a variety of strange ways. One 
unit foreman interviewed related a technique that he used 
to use to keep his men from abusing their privileges. In 
order to see that his men did not take too long for their 
breaks, he kept a 54" ventiliation fan near the unit site. 
When it was time for a break, he would turn it off. When 
the break time was over he would turn it back on. The 
noise created would be enough of a deterrent to force even 
the most obstinate employee back to his work area. This 
sort of attitude or "rule with an iron fist" did nothing 
but foster the feeling of hatred and mistrust which
ER-3708 104
existed between the union and management for so long.
This autocratic style of management probably did not 
start overnight? but rather it took years to develop into 
its final form. It probably did not start at the front 
line supervisory level either. It must have started at or 
near the top. There must have been authoritarian rela­
tionships between the different management levels. If a 
person at the top level acts in an autocratic fashion, the 
people below him will have a tendency to respond in an 
autocratic fashion. They in turn will tend to treat the 
people below them in exactly the same manner. This 
"trickle down" effect would eventually propagate itself 
throughout the entire company. In this sort of system, 
workers would tend to perform only well enough to avoid 
punishment and ridicule by their supervisors. This in 
turn would stifle the operation in terms of productivity 
and potential.
The new style of management is one based on partici­
pation. Participation is defined as "to take part, share, 
or join with others" (Davies, 1976). Therefore, a parti­
cipatory management would be one in which all the 
employees participate in the operation of the company.
Just as there are distinctive differences between 
autocratic and participatory management, there are also 
distinctive variations of participatory management which
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could be employed. One extreme is that all employees 
would be involved in all levels of the company's 
operation. This would include financial and corporate 
policy decisions. This system would be cumbersome and 
time consuming for all but the very smallest of firms. 
Copper Range's size makes this example impossible. In 
addition, most employees of Copper Range lack the 
expertise to make rational judgments about such things as 
policy.
The second type of participatory management is one 
in which employees involve themselves in matters which 
they are capable of understanding. There are areas where 
this is quite practical, and where they can be extremely 
valuable. They can contribute to such items as work 
methodology, working environment concerns, and performance 
criteria.
It is very difficult for all employees to assume the 
role of a manager. In some instances it may be 
impossible. According to Dr. David Fletcher, a management 
expert at the Colorado School of Mines, management has six 








A person whose function does not fall into one of 
these categories is not a manager. Therefore, they cannot 
expect to participate in company matters which are at a 
management level.
In Copper Range's situation the primary 
vehicle used in the participatory management style is the 
employee work group(s). There are 88 in all, and involve 
every employee. Through the work group, each person is 
given the opportunity to participate in his or her 
company. They can discuss matters which affect the day- 
to-day operation of their work area. They can make 
suggestions or initiate projects which would increase 
efficiency and productivity, or reduce costs. If a 
situation is out of the group's authority, they can 
request a representative from another department to attend 
their meeting and discuss it. They also have the 
opportunity to pass their ideas along to one of the 
various committess for further action. One such item is a 
monthly recommendation to the awards committee concerning 
an employee who they would like to recognize for their 
outstanding work record.
One thing which should be taken into account is the 
idea that the opportunity is available, but whether or not
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a person chooses to participate is up to the individual. 
You cannot force a person to participate in a work group 
meeting. They have to want to get involved.
Some employees may never get involved. The author 
has observed and interviewed such people at White Pine. 
They do not believe that a participatory system will work. 
They are not to blame for their attitudes, for they are 
the product of 30 years of poor management-union relation­
ships. It is hard to teach an old dog new tricks.
On the other hand, personal observation can attest 
to the fact that there are many people who have changed 
their attitudes substantially. Some people became 
involved without consciously intending to. In an inter­
view with Dr. Herman Ponder, Vice President, he reported, 
"I have one guy tell me 'Well, I didn't intend to but I've 
bought into the program. I've never felt so good about my 
job, my work, and my life'." (Pierce, DebPozega, 2 March 
1987).
Changing people's attitudes has not happened com­
pletely, and it has not happened overnight, but it is 
happening. Once given the opportunity it is amazing what 
some of the employees can contribute to the work environ­
ment if someone will simply take the time to listen.
Their suggestions are often innovative and creative.
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The foundation for a participatory management system 
has been laid, and a lot of people at White Pine are 
trying to make it work. Francis Tannheimer, a miner, 
stated it as "the men pull together more now. They're 
part of the company. Everything just works smoothly." 
(Pierce, DebPozega, 2 March 1987).
It is doubtful that Copper Range would be as suc­
cessful as it has been without changing over to a partici­
patory style of management. However, there would appear 
to be some problems with the implementation of the system, 
not necessarily the theory. These will be discussed 
later.
The Cave
In January of 1988, the White Pine Mine began to 
experience ground problems north of 68-67 belt line and 
east of the main north-south line. This is approximately 
located in the vicinity of 25000N x 33000E on Figure 6. 
Ground problems continued throughout the month causing 
damage to airwalls, supplies, and the main water line.
The company initially started to install steel sets around 
the belt line to protect it. This proved to be fruitless 
as the ground was converging too rapidly. They changed 
over to cedar posts, and a total of 1,246 were installed 
in the area. In addition, pillars were wrapped and steel 
posts installed along the belt line.
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Despite their efforts, the cave continued to advance 
in a southwesterly direction. It dropped across 67 belt 
on February 4 and took it out of service. The final area 
of the cave is represented by the cross-hatched area on 
the map.
At some point in the past, a decision was made to 
mine 10 feet of Copper Harbor sandstone out of the floor 
in the area of the cave. Dr. John Able of the Mining 
Engineering Department at the Colorado School of Mines 
reports that this drastically altered the configuration of 
the pillars. What was originally 72 feet, 12-18 feet high 
pillars were now changed to 22-28 feet high. This 
exceeded an acceptable width to height ratio and 
eventually accelerated the deterioration of the pillars.
The ramifications of this event were truly 
devastating and could well have been fatal to the company 
had it not been for the quick thinking and determination 
of those involved. The primary and most immediate 
effect was that the southwest production area was cut off 
from any way to get their ore out of the mine. Muck would 
have ordinarily traveled up 67 belt, but that would be a 
bit difficult now. Since this was the primary production 
source, they had to find some way of supplementing it. 
Subsequent plans resulted in new production units being 
started in Division I, located at 27000N x 49000E. Units
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in Division 3 were "beefed up” to provide as much extra 
ore as possible. As we have seen in Figures 19 and 22, 
their production and productivity took a terrible beating.
The plan to bring the southwest area back into 
production involved driving a series of three belt drifts 
at 24000N between 30000E and 35000E. This would 
effectively detour around the cave area and link back up 
with the existing belt lines. This drift and belt were 
completed at approximately the end of May and operations 
at White Pine began to return to normal.
The economic impact of this traumatic period was 
undoubtedly the most severe. According to Mr. Mike Dunn, 
Vice President of Copper Range, lost revenues and capital 
expenditures totalled approximately $15 million. In 
addition, the company had to borrow another $6 million in 
working capital to make ends meet. He further stated in 
an interview on December 12, 1988 that "It [the cave] 
nearly bankrupted us." He also reported that at one point 
the company had as little as $150,000 in the bank with 
which to work. This is a very narrow margin for error for 
a company of almost 1,000 people. In an interview with 
Ken Pohle, V.P. of Operations, on the same day, he stated, 
"It [the cave] turned what could have been a very 
profitable year into a break even year." Had the company 
been in full production, without any unexpected setbacks,
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they might have been able to take advantage of the higher 
copper prices. Figure 14 showed that the current copper 
price throughout this ordeal was as high as it had been in 
eight years. Had the cave not occurred, Copper Range 
would have prospered economically. However, due to the 
extra costs incurred, they were only able to break even in 
1988. It would have been extremely interesting to see 
what sort of condition Copper Range would have been in had 
things been different. Perhaps if the high copper price 
persists through 1989, we will still have this 
opportunity.
There are some other effects of the cave which are 
not quite as obvious, but just as serious. These facts 
were related through interviews with Copper Range 
Employees. One is that the company did not have the 
opportunity to pass along more of the benefit of the 
higher copper price to the employees. There was no 
guarantee that they would have been able to provide a 
larger profit sharing check. The cave and its subsequent 
results reduced the size of the payout. This has resulted 
in some very hurt feelings among the hourly ranks.
One last effect of the cave was that it scuttled 
plans for an Initial Public Offering (IPO) of 2,900,000 
shares of Copper Range stock to the open market. As it 
would happen the scheduled date for the IPO and the cave
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coincided with each other almost to the day.
The sale of the public stock would have provided 
Copper Range with millions of dollars of debt-free capi­
tal. The initial offering price was expected to be in the 
neighborhood of ten dollars per share, according to repre­
sentatives of Boettcher and Company, one of three under­
writers. The money generated from that sale was to be 
used to retire some of the company's debt, purchase badly 
needed equipment for the mine, and generally upgrade the 
facilities where needed. As it was, the IPO was cancelled 
for obvious reasons. All of the projects which were tar­
geted to receive funds from the sale have had to wait.
Mike Dunn stated in a personal interview that "the IPO 
would have proved to be very successful. It is not neces­
sarily history. It may revive next year."
It is truly unfortunate that the company could not 
carry out its plans for an IPO. The benefit would have 
been monumental. In an ironic sort of way, it is 
fortunate that the cave occurred first, thus allowing the 
IPO to be cancelled. Had the IPO gone through first 
followed by the cave, public perception might have driven 
the stock price so low it might never have recovered.
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Cost Cutting Measures
One last item of note which has helped the company 
is the cost cutting measures which were initiated when the 
mine reopened. The results were obtained from the Apapen- 
dix of the Cost of Sales Estimate for operation of White 
Pine Copper Complex by Stearns Catalytic (1984).
The most predominant factor the company initiated 
occurred in the mine department. It was the effect of 
changing from an 8-hour shift over to a 10-hour shift.
This results in a greater utilization of those 
working, and the ability to reduce the total underground 
work force. Stearns Catalytic estimated that this would 
save $0.79/ton of ore.
Another vital cost cutting measure is the use of 
hydraulic drilling jumbos versus pneumatic. Hydraulic 
jumbos are much more powerful, efficient and productive 
than their pneumatic counterparts. This results in more 
rock being broken per machine. It also results in a 
lowering of the cost of consumables per ton due largely to 
the machines' increased efficiency. Changing over to the 
use of hydraulic jumbos wherever possible was estimated by 
Stearn Catalytic to save the company $0.189/ton per 
machine.
The one-man bolter program instigated was estimated 
by Stearns Catalytic to save the company $0.194/ton per
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machine. Previously, the operation's bolting had centered 
around the use of joy bolters. These were designed to be 
used with two operations. They were capable of installing 
approximately 40 bolts per shift. The new company had the 
opportunity to utilize a fleet of Secoma bolters. These 
are designed to use only one operator, and were supposed 
to be capable of installing approximately 50 bolts per 
shift. However, operators at White Pine have been wit­
nessed by the author installing over 100 bolts in a single 
shift on numerous occasions.
Other cost cutting measures considered included 
conveyor belt recapping, performance monitoring, and the 
use of modified ore haulage equipment. Including those 
other items discussed, these projects were estimated to 
potentially save the company $2.58/ton of ore.
Cost cutting measures on the surface operation 
generally took a different approach. Since the system is 
so highly automated, there was probably very little that 
could have been done to greatly enhance the overall costs. 
According to Dave Pieti, Copper Range Industrial Engineer, 
the greatest effect resulted from reducing the number of 
"fixed stations" which monitor the processes. A "fixed 
station" could be considered to be one person who is 
assigned to monitor and maintain a particular area. 
Everyone just has to cover a larger area and work a bit
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harder. In addition to reducing the number of fixed sta­
tions, the surface facility has also cut costs by consoli­
dating its maintenance departments. Previously, each 
department maintained its own services and handled all the 
maintenance problems in house. Now the maintenance for 
the entire operation is stationed in a central location, 
and service people go where they are needed. This results 
in a much more efficient use of manpower and subsequent 
reductions in costs.
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EXAMPLES OF ESOPs, PROFIT SHARING AND 
PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT
Before proceeding with further discussion of Copper 
Range, let us first look at several other examples of 
ESOPs (Employee Stock Ownership Plan), profit sharing, and 
participatory management. According to the text Managing 
Human Forces in Organizations by Heilman and Hornstein, 
these items are some of the tools used in behavior 
modification. They are termed "reinforcers.11 In this 
case they would be better described as positive 
reinforcers; they also come in negative forms. Positive 
reinforcers are utilized when you want an employee to 
repeat his actions. Negative reinforcers might include 
such things as verbal reprimands, docking pay, and 
demotion. For now we will concentrate on several examples 
of positive behavior modification.
ESOPs
Reopening the White Pine Mine under an Employee 
Stock Ownership Plan was a first for the American mining 
industry. However, ESOP's are anything but new. There 
has been a boom in the number of plans being implemented. 
Ten years ago, 3 million U.S. employees participated in 
ESOPs. Today that number has increased to 10 million, 
which accounts for nearly one-quarter of all corporate 
employees (Ungehauer, 6 February 1989). More than 9,800
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U.S. companies have some form of ESOP program. Of those, 
1,500 of them are majority owned by employees. There are 
some very big name companies which are owned 100% by the 
employees. They include Healthtrust, Avis Car Rental, and 
Weirton Steel. There are a variety of reasons why ESOPs 
are becoming more popular. Financial security, a voice in 
the company, and tax incentives are three of the more 
important reasons. One of the tax incentives allows the 
sponsoring company to deduct the interest and principle on 
the loan used to buy stock for the plan. Another break 
gives banks and other lenders a 50% deduction on their 
income from ESOP loans. This enables them to charge much 
lower interest rates to the ESOP plans.
Generally, ESOPs can be very beneficial to its 
employees. However, in many cases there are also 
sacrifices. Many employees take a cut in wages in order 
to participate in an ESOP program.
Avis Car Rental Company is perhaps the best known 
company that participates in an ESOP program. Its 12,500 
employees own 100% of the stock. Avis is obviously a 
customer service-oriented company. According to Charles 
Finnie, a leading authority on the rental car industry, 
"Right now Avis is on a roll. The ESOP has really 
improved their morale, productivity, and service" 
(Kirkpatrick, 5 December 1988). Service related
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complaints have dropped to 1,238 last year, as compared to 
1,918 in the 12 month period ending August 1987.
The results can also be seen clearly on the balance 
sheet. Compared to the first six months of 1987, during 
which time Avis was owned by Wesray Capital, the first six 
months of 1988 showed an increase of 35% in operating 
profit.
Another company which has seen tremendous success 
with an ESOP program is North American Tool & Die (NATD). 
NATO is founded on three principles. First, make the 
company profitable; second, share the wealth; and last, 
have fun doing it. The company accomplishes some of this 
through a participatory system. All employees practice 
and preach the doctrine of quality and service. They 
recognize excellence through their "Super Person of the 
Month” award. All NATD employees also screen potential 
job applicants to see if they will fit in with the 
program.
The second part of the plan and its foundation are 
accomplished through the ESOP program. Each employee is 
given free shares of the company's stock because according 
to the owner Thomas Melohn, "They have earned the right to 
be given company stock" (Melohn, August 1987).
The success of NATO's ESOP is well documented.
Sales have increased at more than twice the industry
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standard for the past six years. Stock prices have 
increased 40% per year. The return on investment is in 
the top 10 of the Fortune 500. The employee turnover rate 
is less than 4%. Absenteeism is less than 1%. As far as 
quality is concerned, NATD has a rejection rate of 0.1% 
for all parts for the last three years.
Unfortunately, not all ESOPs are as successful as 
Avis or NATD. Hyatt Clark Industries is a very good 
example of an ESOP which did not work. Hyatt Clark (HCI) 
was originally owned by General Motors. The hard times 
which hit the American automobile industry resulted in HCI 
being placed on the auction block in 1980. Subsequent 
action resulted in General Motors signing a 3 year 
customer contract with the Hyatt Clark Job Preservation 
Committee. This projected a $100 million-a-year business 
for HCI. After securing a $53 million loan, a purchase 
agreement was signed in 1981 between General Motors and 
HCI making HCI a 100% employee-owned operation.
The history of HCI's labor relations was not all 
that good. The hourly workers were represented by Local 
736 of the United Auto Workers. According to an article 
in Management Review, "Under GM, Local 736 had a history 
of militancy and labor strife unsurpassed in the auto 
industry" (Woodworth, February 1988).
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The initial start of HCI looked promising. 
Production, quality and customer service improved 
dramatically. The number of grievances declined. They 
experienced a $1 million profit in 1983 and a $4 million 
profit in the first part of 1984. HCI's prosperity was 
to be short-lived. The seemingly harmonious labor 
relations would not last. The primary problem affecting 
them is their failure to overcome their past union- 
management troubles and work cooperatively together.
There was lack of definition as to what ownership meant 
and the respective roles that both management and union 
would play. The result was an ESOP in name only. The 
union continued to be mistrustful of management and the 
two sides could not join forces.
In the end, HCI did not survive. They began to look 
for a buyer in 1985 after reportedly losing millions.
Today, the plant stands empty and idle.
Each of these examples of Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans bears some resemblance to the Copper Range's ESOP. 
Avis and NATD are both operated in similar fashions and 
are experiencing incredible success. The most striking 
similarity to Copper Range is in the example of Hyatt 
Clark Industries. HCI was a union operation with a 
history of very poor labor-management relations, just like 
Copper Range. Both were threatened with closure before the
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ESOP became an alternative. Hopefully Copper Range will 
be able to avoid the results experienced by HCI.
Profit Sharing
Another form of behavior modification is that of 
profit sharing. Many companies that do not participate in 
an ESOP do participate in a profit sharing program. Some 
such corporations include Ford, General Motors, Hewlett- 
Packard Co. and USX. The concept behind profit sharing is 
very similar to an ESOP. Many companies such as these are 
hoping that "profit sharing will rebuild teamwork among 
surviving workers and get them to focus on how their 
performance relates to company profitability" (Watching 
the Bottom Line, 7 November, 1988).
Aluminum Company of America is another company which 
is betting its future on profit sharing. Its plan becomes 
effective after its operating profit exceed 6% of its $5 
billion U.S. assets. This is expected to reward its 7,000 
employees with a bonus of approximately 7% of their 
salaries. This year, Alcoa CEO Paul H. O'Neil stated that 
"This is not a give away program.... It only produces 
rewards when we as a team produce" (Watching the Bottom 
Line, Business Week. 7 November 1988). This program is 
similar to Copper Range's in that the firm must produce a 
certain amount of profit before everyone benefits.
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The concept of profit sharing has been around for 
many years in one form or another. One such plan was 
developed by Joseph N. Scanlon and was appropriately named 
the Scanlon Plan. The concepts of the plan are outlined 
in a book by Frederick Glesieur of the same title. The 
plan is based on two facets: (1) the measurement, and (2)
the participation process.
Scanlon felt that the "measurement should be simple 
and easy to understand so that when workers receive a 
bonus they knew why they got it, and when they didn't 
receive a bonus they knew why they didn't get one." 
(Lesieur, 1950, p. 41). The participation part of the 
plan was all based on teamwork and honesty. It is 
extremely important to get all of the different functions 
of the company to realize their importance to each other, 
and to develop a willingness to work together" (Lesieur, 
1950, p. 40).
Unfortunately, the Scanlon Plan never achieved 
widespread success. There was a great amount of mistrust 
on the part of the workers. They felt that the "profit" 
that they were all supposed to share could be manipulated 
by the management, thus reducing their cut. Similar 
attitudes still persist at White Pine, even though they 
are not using the Scanlon Plan.
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Participatory Management
Many of these companies, whether they are utilizing 
an ESOP, profit sharing or both rely on the concept of 
participatory management. One such company, Rohm & Haas 
Bayport, Inc. has taken the idea to its extreme limits. 
There are only two managers between the plant mangers and 
the remaining 61 technicians, engineers and chemists.
There are no foremen or supervisors. Each employee is in 
effect a manager, because they perform many of the func­
tions described as being management related. They work in 
teams and routinely make decisions concerning operations, 
production and quality control. They also evaluate each 
other's performance and review job applications. Each 
employee is paid on a salary basis and receives periodic 
pay increases based on their reviews (Nichols, August 
1987) .
Not all companies which attempt to introduce a 
participatory management program are as successful as Rohm 
& Haas Bayport, Inc. Copper Range is a good example of 
that fact. It is a very difficult thing to initiate and 
requires much thought. In an article in Training entitled 
"Participatory Management Is a Double Edged Sword,"
Stanley Herman points out five precautions that should be 
taken into account. They are:
Do not introduce participatory management when 
radical changes are needed quickly.
It is seldom economical to try to build a 
participatory team out of people who interact 
only occasionally.
Participation is only conversation unless it 
produces action.
Effective employee participation need not always 
include final decision making.
Don't ask for participation in making a decision 
that has already been made. Ask instead how to 
make it work.
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PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY COPPER RANGE
All things considered, the management and employees 
of White Pine have done very well in their efforts to make 
the mine a success. Getting it opened was a miracle, 
keeping it open has been an uphill fight every step of the 
way. Personal observation and experiences on the part of 
the author can testify to that.
Copper Range's regeneration is not yet complete.
They are still suffering from several serious problems 
which threaten to undermine the stability of the company. 
The part that is at risk is not so much the superstructure 
of the operation, but the foundation of the employee 
owned/involved operation.
Perceptions of Inequity and Inequality
Based on personal obversations, interviews and the 
Work Group Survey Memo, it would appear that the most 
alarming phenomena that the company is experiencing are 
perceptions of inequity and inequality. A lot of the 
employes, particularly in the underground operation do not 
feel as if they are being treated fairly and equally. 
Honestly, this is probably only a matter of their 
imaginations. As a former employee of the company, the 
author knows that the management has endeavored to do the 
best that it possibly could for its employees, and to
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treat each as fairly and equitably as possible. It is a 
better deal than they are likely to find anywhere else in 
the area. However, this does not alter the fact that 
these people believe it, and in their opinions that makes 
it so. This is a very volatile situation. In the 
following pages, we will discuss some of the possible 
reasons.
The easiest aspect of this problem to document is 
the fact that a large majority of the employees do not 
feel like owners of the company. They do not feel as 
though they have an equal or equitable stake in the 
company. As part of the recent employee involvement work 
group survey, that very question was asked. "Do you feel 
like part owners of the company?" A total of 63% of those 
responding said "no." The employees on the surface were 
roughly split in half on their response. However, in the 
underground operation, only one-quarter (26%) said that 
they did feel like a part owner.
These feelings that the employees have are brought 
about by a number of factors. Based on personal observa­
tion, it would appear that one major contributor is the 
conflict between the concept of the union and the concept 
of an employee-owned company. According to our earlier 
references to Organizational Behavior by Hodgetts and 
Altman, people join a group because of a similarity fac-
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tor. The hourly people joined the union because they 
believed that it would protect them and represent them 
toward their best interests against the management.
Regardless of how much employee attitudes toward the 
company have professed to have changed, it does not alter 
the fact that a large majority of them still belong to 
this union. At the same time, all of the employees belong 
to a larger group consisting of the employee/owners of the 
company. The relationship of the employees as owners of 
the company should take priority over the relationship of 
the employees to their union.
It would definitely be interesting to see what kind 
of condition Copper Range would be in if the union was not 
present. It does not seem logical that the members of one 
group (the owners) can become truly harmonious and united 
in their efforts, while part of those members also belong 
to a subgroup (the union) whose purpose it is to monitor 
and protect its members against the actions of the first. 
The author is doubtful that the hourly employees will ever 
commit themselves 100% to being owners of their own com­
pany while they have the union to fall back on. The union 
provides them with a sense of security that prohibits them 
from becoming totally involved in the ownership of the 
business.
This lack of "ownership attitudes11 manifests itself
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toward the company in a variety of ways. The most predom­
inant of which is the fact that many of the employees are 
totally unsympathetic towards any of the company's prob­
lems. Anyone who has any knowledge of business knows that 
running any company is a risk process. However, the 
employees interviewed do not seem to understand the fact 
that when you are an owner, you have to take the good 
times as well as the bad. During the recent cave-in that 
nearly put the company out of business, some employees 
were still complaining that since copper was selling for 
so much they should have been making more money. Had they 
felt more like owners, they would have realized that their 
primary concern should have been to keep the company sol­
vent, not padding their own pockets. Personal observation 
confirms that any deviation from normal business practices 
or day-to-day operation is viewed by some employees to be 
nothing more than management trying to cheat them.
A possible contributor to this problem lies in the 
price of copper and in the company's failure to relate its 
effects on the operation to the employees. The original 
plan was laid out on the basis of copper selling for 
approximately $0.65/lb. Sensitivity analysis was 
undoubtedly performed to analyze how profitable or 
unprofitable the operation might be as the price of copper 
fluctuated up or down.
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In the early days of the negotiations between the 
union and the company, certain statements were made 
concerning the relationship between the price of copper 
and the economic rewards to be received. One of the 
miners remembered what was said almost verbatim. He 
remarked in an interview that "we were told at $0.82 a
pound we would drive a Cadillac and at $1.00 a pound we
would be the highest paid miners in the country." They
remember this, and they expected it to come true.
The problem arises in that the company did not 
adequately educate its employees as to the nature of these 
fluctuations and how they would affect the operation.
This resulted in a misunderstanding among employees as to 
how the distribution of earnings might be changed if 
copper reached a certain level. It is understandable that 
employees felt cheated when copper reached $1.40/lb., and 
they were not being additionally rewarded.
This is a very subtle point and was probably the 
result of a simple misunderstanding. However, if blame 
had to be placed it would have to lie with management for 
not communicating the facts to the employees.
Another very good example of these feelings of in­
equity is the wages paid to hourly employees. The current 
contract states that the base wage is to be an average of 
$8.50 per hour. There is a provision to adjust the wages
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for each job class up or down every six months so that the 
average remains there. The company has had to make these 
adjustments, and it has inevitably caused a problem. The 
hourly people view it as management cheating them. They 
think it is unfair, even though it is in the contract.
The contract that they voted into existence.
The last perception of inequality addreses the fact 
that the employees feel that their concerns, comments, 
suggestions and questions are being ignored. There does 
seem to be some evidence to support the idea. Even if it 
is not true, the employees believe that it is? and that in 
itself is a problem.
Interviews with several employees during a recent 
visit to the property revealed that they do not believe 
they know what is going on in their own company. As one 
man put it, "we are still working, so far, but we don't 
know what the hell is going on. There is poor 
communication within the company. They don't tell us 
anything." This was not an isolated comment.
This could easily be written off as a few indivi­
duals' opinions. However, there seems to be evidence that 
would support that it is much more widespread. As an add­
on comment to the work group survey memo, Joe Gheller 
added:
There is a lot of reference to stonewalling, 
lack of cooperation by management and other
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departments, lack of followup, ongoing problems 
with no progress etc. Obviously, this is not 
just a few disgruntled work group's opinions....
A widespread opinion is that management goes 
along with the work groups only when it is to 
their advantage to do so or in line with their 
thinking.
Lack of cooperation and communication is a very 
serious problem. When an employee or work group issues a 
comment or suggestion, and there is no response from 
management, it has several results. The first is that it 
reaffirms the opinion that management does not care about 
its employees and is not to be trusted. The second is 
that it tells the person that whatever his comment was, it 
was not worthy of a response. The end result is that it 
stifles communications. This adds to the problems of 
perceptions of inequity and inequality.
The Incentive System
Another perception of inequity concerns the incen­
tive system. As we have discussed earlier, the incentive 
system in effect at White Pine is a fairly complicated 
one. It is presented in Appendix E for review. Based on 
personal experience, the author can testify that the 
balance of rewards between one incentive group and another 
has tended to be a little bit lopsided on occasion. This 
is viewed as a terrible injustice. What was originally 
intended to be a morale booster results in being a morale 
downer. How much one receives becomes a measure of how
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much the company values the employee. It is very diffi­
cult to motivate oneself to work harder when the efforts 
do not appear to be gaining any reward. Even if rewards 
do start to increase, it would appear to be a natural 
tendency that they cannot increase fast enough to rein­
force what the employee belives he is contributing to the 
company. The balance will always lean towards the effort 
of the employee outweighing the rewards.
Part of the problem with Copper Range's incentive 
plan might be in the number of different groups. Differ­
ent groups each try to earn an incentive based on a stan­
dard rate developed by the company. However, each group 
is working under a variety of conditions and with a vari­
ety of problems associated with each. Some groups do not 
seem to have any problems making a high incentive pay, 
while others appear to be plagued with them. For some 
groups, there does not appear to be any direct connection 
between their efforts and increased incentive pay. As a 
former member of the technical services group, it seemed 
impossible to realize the high incentive pay being 
received in the mill and smelter. In some cases, the 
nature of the program overlooked the contribution of an 
individual because his efforts did not fall into one of 
the predesignated categories. One very good example of 
this is in the case of Mr. Paul Koski. Mr. Koski was the
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mine planning engineer who participated in the design and 
construction of the new belt haulage tunnel and the subse­
quent installation of the conveying system. Although he 
designed and supervised much of the activity, he did not 
receive the benefit of any of the incentives being paid 
for that project. The conflicts which arose from this 
situation eventually resulted in his dismissal. Even 
though his firing was admittedly self-initiated and the 
company was well within its rights, it could have recog­
nized beforehand the fact that Mr. Koskizs contribution 
was extremely valuable. Had they done so, the company 
might have been able to rectify the problem before it lost 
a valuable employee.
The problems that Copper Range has experienced with 
its incentive system are not unique. Historically, there 
has been a problem with them for many of the some reasons 
discussed here. In many instances, the programs eventual­
ly become a give-away and do not reflect any sort of true 
contribution on the part of the employees. Hopefully, 
Copper Range's incentive plan will right itself and avoid 
these pitfalls.
Flaws in the Participatory System
The Copper Range Company is suffering from other 
problems which threaten to sabotage the employee involve-
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ment program. These problems are very difficult to detect 
and probably even more difficult to correct.
The participatory system on which the company is 
founded is working, but it has been seen though per­
sonal observations and experiences that it could be work­
ing better. One reason for this is that, in spite of what 
everybody is supposed to be doing, hints of autocratic 
management still persist. It would not be fair to say 
that all managers are acting this way because they are 
not. The large majority of those encountered at White 
Pine make an honest effort to folow the participatory 
style.
The real problem at White Pine occurs in those few 
managers encountered who have not as yet adopted the idea 
of participatory management. There are managers observed 
personally in which the autocratic style is still predomi­
nant. Some of them operate at the foreman level, while 
others operate at considerably higher levels in the hier­
archy. For some of them, it may be that the reaction is 
subconscious, but there are others where it does to appear 
to be so. There are managers at White Pine who create the 
impression of acting in a participatory manner. Once they 
have been observed over a period of time, it becomes quite 
obvious that under the facade is a hidden strong auto­
cratic force.
ER-3708 135
The reason why these latent feelings persist and how 
to remove them are well beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, for now, it is possible to make some general 
assumptions as to some possible reasons.
Witnesses to the era report that in his prime, a 
manager at White Pine was a position of considerable 
responsibility and in certain instances, power. A super­
visor who had subordinates under him ruled with supreme 
authority. Orders were given, and in most cases there was 
very little room for discussion. Considering the rela­
tionship which existed between management and union, that 
is probably the only way that it could have been.
Copper Range was, and still is today to a smaller 
extent, a matter of many companies within a company. The 
men who ran those companies in the past enjoyed a great 
deal of power. Top managers had control over a large 
number of employees and territory. These men all had, in 
the author's opinion, what amounted to their own little 
"kingdoms." Some of them are reported to have benefitted 
monetarily, while others enjoyed the benefits of being in 
absolute control.
The Copper Range of today is, or should be, in a 
much different situation. The company is owned by all the 
employees and they are supposed to participate in running 
it. That is the way that it is intended to be. However,
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many of the men who were in top positions before are still 
there. As a result, some of those "kingdoms" still exist 
today. They may not be as obvious or as big, but they are 
still there.
There is a substantial amount of territorial prero­
gative in existence at White Pine. This is based on per­
sonal observation. These "kingdoms" that exist were un­
doubtedly hard won, and the "kings" do not feel inclined 
to give up any of their power or authority.
In the past, autocratic management had a very domi­
nant role at White Pine. Today however there is no room 
for any trace of it at Copper Range. The company was 
founded on the principle of participatory management, and 
autocratic management must be completely eliminated. A 
person who acts in an autocratic manner will tend to ex­
tend that attitude down to all of his employees. There­
fore, those who are managing in this fashion, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, are denying their subordi­
nates of the opportunity to experience the participatory 
system. If the mangement cannot set a good example, the 
author does not believe that the hourly ranks will ever 
accept the idea of participation 100%. Those who are in 
this position(s) should either be educated to understand 
the difference, or removed from where they can continue to 
do damage.
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Another problem with the participatory system is 
that there appears to be a miscommunication between 
management and workers as to what level they were going to 
participate. It is the author's opinion that management 
originally intended for the employees to participate in 
terms of work methodology, etc. However, many employees 
encountered at White Pine were under the impression that 
they were to participate at a much higher level. These 
two beliefs are antithetical. According to Dr. David 
Fletcher, "this misunderstanding has led some people to 
believe that they can contribute to the management as an 
individual, when workers can contribute only as a group."
It is difficult to say who is to blame for this
problem. It might be the management's failure to clearly 
define what it expected from its employees. Or it could
be the union's fault for failing to find out what
"participation" meant to its members.
The Deterioration of Employee Attitudes
One result of all of these problems is that the 
employees' attitudes appear to have deteriorated drama­
tically between early 1986 and late 1988. The employees 
observed in the beginning were very enthusiastic, energe­
tic and optimistic. They were glad to be returning to 
work after so much time off. Those met recently do not 
have the same spark as they did before. Some of their
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enthusiasm is gone, and they are not as optimistic about 
what the future might hold.
It is difficult to say, without further analysis, 
which of the factors discussed is the more predominant in 
changing their attitudes. For some it might be the feel­
ing that they are not the owners of the company. For 
others it might be the failure to receive any substantial 
monetary rewards. Three years is a long time to wait, and 
as one employee who was interviewd said, 11 [you] can't buy 
things with a promise." Others may be disappointed that 
they do not appear to have as great a voice in the company 
as they thought they were going to have.
Hopefully these attitudes will improve as the 
company continues to recover from its recent economic 
hardship. Since that was a temporary situation, the 
employees' feelings of frustration and disappointment 
should have reason for improvement in the near future.
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CONCLUSIONS
The reopening of the White Pine Mine and the 
formation of the new Copper Range Company was a very 
daring and courageous undertaking by all those concerned 
in the negotiations and all those who were to follow.
Russ Wood and the others who led the way had the foresight 
to know that the old days were gone, and that if the 
operation was going to succeed, a lot of things were going 
to have to change. The plans for the new operation were 
innovative and creative. They literally broke new ground 
in the area of employee management relations in mining.
The result: the first and only employee owned mine in the
United States.
The success of the operation from an operations 
standpoint is incontrovertible. They have succeeded in 
doing exactly what they set out to do —  produce more 
copper, more efficiently, with fewer people, safely, and 
at a lower cost than ever before. We have seen that they 
have succeeded in altering these parameters for the 
better. Some of the changes have been substantial, such 
as the increases in productivity. Personal experience as 
a participant in this experiment can testify to the fact 
that changes such as these cannot be made easily and 
reflect a signifient change in the way people think and 
work. The success of the Copper Range Company in reopen­
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ing the White Pine Mine can only be attributed to a team 
effort.
Unfortunately the operation is not running as 
smoothly as it could be. Despite its success, it con­
tinues to have problems which hamper the prosperity of the 
operation and threaten to undermine its foundation. How­
ever, they do not appear to be unsolvable in light of what 
has already been accomplished. Solving the problems re­
maining will require just as much team work, creativity 
and patience as has been exhibited up to now. It is the 
author's opinion that the employees of Copper Range will 
try their best.
Throughout the course of this paper we have examined 
the nature of the Copper Range Company. We have documen­
ted its successes and isolated some of the problems that 
are hampering its continued progress. In order to change 
the future of the operation some measures might have to be 
taken to alleviate them. There are obviously many 
opinions involved, and this report has presented the case 
from a particular point of view —  that of an employee who 
worked closely with both union and management personnel. 
Unfortunately, this report is not capable of elaborating 
as to exactly how these alternatives might be executed, 
only that they are something to think about.
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The Union
Historically the union at White Pine (the United 
Steel Workers Local 5024) may have served a valuable pur­
pose. It has served a purpose in the early stages of the 
negotiations in that it gave Russ Wood access to a readily 
available workforce. Working with the top union officials 
such as Eldon Kirsch allowed him to work out the details 
of getting the mine reopened without involving hundreds of 
segregated parties. Today, however, the union is an 
anachronism. It has been documented that the employees do 
not feel like owners, and there is the distinct possiblity 
that this is the result of the conflict that arises when 
one person belongs to two opposing groups. Having a union 
that only includes part of the employees in an employee 
owned company which includes all of them is redundant.
The union employees encountered at White Pine still hold 
very strong ties to that organization. The author 
believes that the traditional makeup of their union pro­
hibits them from committing themselves 100% to the 
employee owned philosophy.
Local 5024 of the United Steel Workers of America 
has found itself in a very interesting position. It 
is in the middle of a paradox. For the first time in 
U.S. history, a mining company has become involved in a 
100% Employee Stock Ownership Program. Therefore, Local
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5024 of the USWA is effectively the majority stockholder 
of an important mining property. With that distinction 
comes grave responsibilities of which it may or may not 
be aware.
The traditional role of the union at White Pine will 
no longer work adequately. Traditionally, the union's 
role was to look out for its members' position within the
organization. Today the situation is entirely different.
It still has the responsibility of protecting its 
members, plus the added responsibility of protecting the 
company. Its members and Copper Range are one in the 
same. One cannot exist without the other. The primary 
goal of the union is to protect its members. The primary 
goal of a shareholder is to protect the company and 
eventually receive a return on his investment. It may be 
difficult to choose when the goals of the company and the
goals of its members do not appear to match. This is a
conflict that this union has never found itself in before.
Being on both sides of the fence is undoubtedly an 
uncomfortable position. The Local 5024 needs to conduct a 
very careful self analysis of its relationship to the 
employees, the management and the company. The ultimate 
success of the Copper Range Company will be achieved by 
management and workers working together. The union may 
wish to consider if the objectives of the company and the
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employees can best be served by maintaining its certifica­
tion. In addition, they may wish to consider if maintain­
ing their traditional nature might be counter-productive 
while the employees have achieved adequate representation 
through their ownership position.
Eliminate Wage Distinctions
Another alternative which might be considered to 
help improve relations between management and labor would 
be to restructure the wage system. This could be accom­
plished by putting all employees on a salary basis. By 
eliminating the hourly rate pay scale, the "hourly 
employees” might feel more like "employee/owners." This 
might in turn help to foster the idea that all of the 
employees are equal.
Salaries could, of course, be at different levels 
just as they are today in the salaried ranks. A person's 
salary could be representative of his job grade (Driller- 
B1aster. Tram Opertor) just like they do under the present 
system. Each grade could have a salary range thus giving 
an employee room for growth within that grade. It would 
also allow for an equitable balance between experienced 
and unexperienced operators with a grade. Copper Range 
currently operates with two different types of salaried 
employees: exempt and non-exempt. Exempt employees are
not subject to the wage and hour laws which determine the
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amount of time they must spend on the job each week. 
Subsequently they are not eligible for overtime pay. The 
hourly workers could be made non-exempt salaried 
employees. This would give them an incentive to come to 
work each day, plus the benefit of overtime pay in the 
event they work additional hours.
Once everyone is put on a salaried basis, all of the 
grades and ranges should be publicly posted. If you don't 
know how much another person is making, it is natural to 
assume that he is making more than you are. Making the 
salaries public knowledge would help to eliminate some of 
the distrust which has existed between the union and the 
management. Some of the hourly ranks are under the 
impression that a salaried person is making an exhorbitant 
amount of money. On one occasion in 1986, a group of 
miners was surprised to find out what their foreman (the 
author in this case) earned, and that it was not nearly as 
much as they expected. Posting grade and ranges publicly 
would indicate that each position person is being compen­
sated an equitable amount based on responsibilities and 
skills required.
As one example of a tremendously successful company 
which utilizes a salary system, refer to Rohm & Haas 
Bayport, Inc. cited earlier. Their program does not 
contain any distinctions between "hourly" and "salaried"
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employees. This has contributed to the success of the 
operation.
Another example of a company which is successfully 
utilizing a salary system is Placer Dome Mining. Each 
employee is paid on a salary basis, regardless of his 
function. In an interview with John Durr, an engineer at 
the Bald Mountain Mine, he indicated that this system is 
very beneficial. It helps to foster a sense of team work, 
equity, and participation.
The Incentive System
As was discussed earlier, the incentive system con­
sists of six groups who earn incentives based on their 
performance. It is quite obvious that there was a lot of 
time and thought put into its design. Logically it is 
really quite fair in the way that each group is rewarded. 
Unfortunately the people who receive those rewards do not 
appear to think logically, so the plan is perceived to be 
unequitable. It breeds segregation between the different 
groups.
The employees at White Pine are all working towards 
a common goal. The prosperity of the company and the 
unity of the workforce. One alternative way to make 
things more equitable would be the elimination of the six 
incentive group distinctions, placing all of the employees
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onto an incentive plan which is composed of one group: 
the employee/owners of Copper Range. The incentive could 
still be calculated based on the same parameters: pro­
ductivity, safety and materials. This would eliminate a 
handout system which has become so very common. When the 
group did not perform up to standards, everyone could 
still receive the $0.50 per hour minimum. When the opera­
tion earned more than the minimum, all of the employes 
would prosper and they would be doing it together. Elimi­
nating incentive group distinctions might help foster 
attitudes of equity and equality.
The Participatory Management System
We have discussed the principles of the partici­
patory management system and its enormous benefit to the 
company. As Mike Dunn stated, "We could not have done it 
without employee involvement" (Job Training News, April 
1987). This is probably true. However, we have also 
discussed and documented the idea that there are problems 
with it. One possibility that there are traces of auto­
cratic management still lingering within the organiza­
tional structure of the company.
The underground operation seems to be particularly 
affected. In the final results of the work group survey 
presented in Appendix G, there are striking differences 
between the answers given by underground personnel as
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compared to surface personnel. Only 26% of them feel like 
owners of the company, whereas 52% of the surface people 
do. Only 43% feel that their work groups underground are 
effective. They appear to be more isolated, pesimistic 
and frustrated. Joe Gheller, industrial engineer, 
isolated this problem in his work group survey memo. He 
states, "There is a lot more cooperation, communication 
and a better attitude between management and work groups 
on surface than there is underground."
This is not to say that there is a problem only in 
the mine, or that all mine managers are acting in an auto­
cratic fashion. The large majority of management person­
nel encountered at White Pine, both surface and under­
ground, acted in a cooperative, participatory manner. 
However, the surveys would tend to indicate that there is 
a distinct problem in the mine, and that should be 
addressed.
In all fairness, it should be pointed out that any 
specific problems which do exist may or may not be the 
result of autocratic management. The very nature of a 
mine makes open communication among its employees very 
difficult. Men work in isolated areas and might not have 
an opportunity to interact with management on a daily 
basis. In the surface operation, interacting with a mana­
ger might be as simple as walking to his office. Because
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of the widespread geographic distribution of the workers 
in the mine, the problem is a little more complicated.
Just as in the case of the union, the management of 
Copper Range could endeavor to reexamine its own position 
within the company. By conducting a self analysis of its 
own operation, it might be able to discover the source and 
solution to some of its problems. It might also be able 
to find a way to make the parts of the operation that are 
running well run better. It might be able to determine if 
any of the old "autocratic" methods are still being 
practiced, or if the communications network is adequate to 
insure that all employees are able to take full advantage 
of their position as owners of the company. It might even 
get lucky and discover some beneficial characteristic 
about the company of which it has not yet taken advantage.
It would be nice to think that the management of 
Copper Range is examining itself, in addition to its other 
duties. However, perhaps it has not had adequate time to 
devote to such a study. Perhaps if it did attempt to do 
so, it might not be able to achieve meaningful results. 
Critical self analysis can be very difficult, like the old 
problem of not being able to "see the forest for the 
trees." If that is the case, perhaps management might 
consider an objective outside consultant. In any event.
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until any problems are diagnosed and treated, it might 
continue to hamper the success of the operation.
Finale
From the time the mine reopened in 1986, the rest of 
the mining industry has been watching the activities at 
White Pine to see if its new approach would succeed and 
how well. The operation has had three years to prove 
themselves. The rest of the minerals industry should be 
impressed with the results, but also aware of some of the 
pitfalls. The experiment conducted at White Pine could 
eventually be a benefit to the entire mining industry. In 
an article entitled "Never Say Die" in the January 1986 
issues of Michigan Business. Russ Wood summarized it well 
by stating, "Successful or not, we will see these ideas 
and seeds flower somewhere else."
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APPENDIX A
GEOLOGIC DESCRIPTION OF THE WHITE PINE ORE BODY
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WHITE PINE STRATIFORM COPPER DEPOSIT 
by R.W. Seasor and A.C. Brown
History of Exploration and Mining. Copper has been known in 
the Nonesuch ShaJe since the 1 ISO's, and mining was first 
undertaken at the Nonesuch mine in 18*5. Although 
disseminated chaicocite was present in these early 
operations, only native copper was recovered. The initial 
White Pine mine, in operation from 1879 to 1881, recovered 
native copper, most of which was located in veins and coarse­
grained sandstones near the base of the Nonesuch Shale.
The Calumet and Hecla Mining Co. began diamond drill 
exploration for widespread native copper in the Nonesuch 
Shale in 190S. Drilling extended eastward from the Nonetuch 
mine site to the White Pine fault, then followed the fault to 
the original White Pine mine shaft. Mining of native copper 
was carried out from three additional shafts from 191* to 
1921.
Copper Range (parent of the White Pine Copper Co.) 
purchased the property from Calumet and Hecla in 1929. 
Exploration resumed in 1937, following the worst of the 
depression years. Advances in the metallurgical recovery of 
chaicocite added a major incentive, and by 19*6, tests 
showed that 83% of the copper minerals could be recovered 
despite the very fine-grained nature of the sulphides. In 
1950, the Korean war led the United States government to 
stimulate development of a major mine and smelter facility 
at White Pine. Production began at a scheduled rate of about 
11,000 tonnes per day in 1953, with pre-production reserves 
of some 230 million tonnes of ore grading -1.2% Cu. 
Production reached 17,200 tonnes/day in 1966) 22,700 
tonnes/day in 1971, and 23,000 tonnes/day in 1973. Total 
production, from the start of modem production in 1953 until 
the mine closed in 1982, was 138,006,290 tonnes averaging 
1.1*% Cu. Current reserves are about 18* million 
extractable tonnes with grades of 1.1% Cu and 6.77 grams 
Ag/tonne.
Ore tonnage estimates at White Pine have been highly 
susceptible to fluctuations in the price of copper. At one 
time, estimated ore exceeded 360 million tonnes at 1.2% 
copper. Historically, the mine has always operated on a close 
profit margin and required careful geological grade control 
programs to maintain a profitable operation . In 1980, the 
mine began to experience a long trend in depressed copper 
prices which led to its closure in 198* and to its sale to Echo 
Bay Ltd. in 1985. The mine risked permanent flooding if not 
maintained. An employee-based proposal and financial 
support from the State permitted re-opening in 1986.
Geology. Classic references on the White Pine geology 
include Butler and Burbank (1929), White and Wright (195*) 
and Ensign et al. (1968). Additional pertinent papers, 
particularly more recent articles dealing with current genetic 
concepts, are also provided in the reference list of this guide. 
The following Is an abbreviated summary of observations 
from these many papers.
The stratigraphie column of Middle and Upper 
Keweenawan units in the White Pine mine area include, in 
ascending order, the Portage Lake Volcanics (formerly the 
Portage Lake Lava Series) including a so-called Unnamed 
Formation, the predominantly reddish Copper Hr- M r 
Conglomerate, the predominantly greyish Nonesuch Shale and 
the reddish Freda Sandstone (Fig. 15c). The mine geology is 
limited to the basal portion of the Nonesuch Shale and the
Figure 22. Stratigraphie column fo r the mine section of the 
basal Nonesuch Shale at White Pine (from Ensign et a(., 
1968).
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uppermost Copper Harbor Conglomerate (Fig. 22). The 
extent, grade, thickness, mineral zoning and local 
stratigraphy of the mine section are known through extensive 
underground workings and some 507 drill cores. Two drill 
holes have explored the Copper Harbor Conglomerate to 
some 1800 metres depth.
The structure of the mine area Is dominated regionally 
by the Porcupine Mountain anticline and overthrust, the Iron 
River and Presque Isle synclines, and numerous high-angle 
faults of which the White Pine fault is the most prominent 
and best foown (Fig. 25). The native-copper ere mentioned 
above is partially vein controlled and found most commonly 
in zones of abundant fracturing, particularly along and 
adjacent to the regional White Pine fault. This prominent 
late-fracture mineralization was a post-ore event 
(Carpenter, 1963; Kelly and Nishioka, 1983; Nishioka et al., 
1983).
Faults of all dimensions are a major concern in the 
mine. For example, offsets of even minor displacement may 
require costly modifications to mining plans, and persistent 
stresses commonly influence the design of room-and-plllar 
mining configurations and determine as well the ultimate 
recovery of ore from mine pillars.
The Mine Stratigraphy. The White Pine mine is confined to a 
narrow stratigraphie zone following the contact between the 
Copper Harbor Conglomerate and Nonesuch Shale formations. 
At the mine scale, copper is found predominantly as
» 0 » ***—
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Figure 23. General geology o f the White Pine area (from  
Leone et ot., 1971).
disseminated diaicocite and minor native copper within the 
basal 0-20 metres of the -200 metre-thick Nonesuch Shale. 
The uppermost 0-6 metres of the underlying Copper Harbor 
Conglomerate may also be mineralized, typically with native 
copper. The mined sections occur in two similar sedimentary 
sequences, each 2-3 metres thick and consisting of a well- 
bedded siltstone-shale unit overlying a coarse-grained 
sandstone. The basal sequence consists of the Lower 
Sandstone and Parting Shale, and upper sequence is composed 
of the Upper Sandstone and Upper Shale (Fig. 22). The Upper 
Sandstone is separated from the Parting Shale by a minor 
erosiona! surface characterized by Indsed stream channels 
and oxidation of the uppermost beds of the Parting Shale.
Within the mine sections, disseminated ore-grade 
copper is confined more specifically to a few narrow 
stratigraphie beds (especially beds 21, 23, 26, 41, *3 and 46). 
Intervening beds contain minor amounts of copper which are 
mined with the high-grade beds to form sections sufficiently 
thick tor conventional room-and-pillar operations. Mining 
may selectively follow only the Parting Shale, a section 
approximately 2.6 m thick; or it may advance separately but 
in parallel along both the Parting Shale and the Upper Shale 
(the latter preferably limited to an approximately 
1.7 m-thick section comprising beds 41, 43 and the lower part 
of 44); or it may exploit a "full column" configuration which 
extends through all beds from the Lower Sandstone to bed 44 
of the Upper Shale, a section measuring approximately 4.6 m 
in thickness. Native copper values in a chloritic facies of the 
Lower Sandstone (Hamilton, 1967) may call for mining of the 
Parting Shale footwall, commonly to a depth of 
approximately one-half metre but in some cases to a depth of 
several metres.
Nature of the Cooper-(Silver) Occurrences. About 87% of 
the copper mined at the present White Pine mine occurs as 
chaicocite; the remainder occurs largely as native copper. 
Native copper is typically found in an irregular, greenish, 
chloritic facies of the Lower Sandstone where no 
sulphides are present, but additional amounts of native 
copper may accompany chaicocite in the most basal 
Nonesuch beds. Both drill core and underground sections 
show that disseminated chaicocite extends continuously 
upward through all basal Nonesuch beds to a so-called 
"fringe" surface which separates the cupriferous zone from 
an overlying pyritic zone occupying the remaining -180 m or 
more of overlying Nonesuch Shale.
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The transition from the cupriferous to pyritic zones has 
been interpreted (White, 1960a; Kelly, 1962; Brown, 1963, 
1968, 1971; Brown and Trammell,! 966; White and 
Wright, 1966) as the final position ot a post-sedimentary 
mineralization front whidi invaded initially Fe-sulphide-rlch 
beds at the base of the carbonaceous Nonesuch Shale. 
Features supporting this concept include textures which 
indicate step-by-step replacement of initial syndSagenetic 
pyrite by Cu-bear ing sulphides; cross-cutting of bedding by 
the fringe surface; an inverse correlation of total copper 
content with the amount of copper in the basal Nonesuch 
(21*23 beds); and abnormal concentrations of Cd-Pb-(Zn) 
immediately above the fringe surface. A zonal pattern 
analogous to the distribution of these metals has been 
reproduced in the laboratory by Brown (197*). Luppens (1970) 
also found anomalous mercury at a fairly uniform distance 
above the fringe.
The source and transport of copper into the base of the 
Nonesuch Shale has been examined by Brown (1968, 1971) at 
the mine-section scale, by D .L  White (1968) and 
Brown (1970) at the mine-district scale, and by
W.S. White (1971) at the Keweenaw rift-basin scale. The 
immediate source is invariably considered to be a reservoir of 
warm chloride-rich brines within the red beds of the Copper 
Harbor Conglomerate. Among the ultimate sources of this 
copper, various authors have suggested: leached traces of 
copper from these immature red beds and/or from the
abundant mafic strata of the underlying Portage Lake 
Volcanics; metamorphic fluids from down-dip extensions of 
the Keweenaw strata, most recently studied by Jolly (197*) 
and U v n a te ta l. (1983); or latent magmatic fluids 
(Sales, 1939) following the important velcanism associated 
with the Keweenaw rift-zone. The disseminated copper is 
interpreted to have been deposited in the sediments before 
faulting and fracturing of the host rocks, and the suggested 
influx of copper Is considered to have taken place during 
early diagenesis of the host strata.
The widespread distribution of disseminated ore-grade 
copper along specific stratigraphie units has also encouraged 
syngenetic explanations for the White Pine deposit. Such 
views were expressed in the earliest comprehensive 
examinations of copper in the modern White Pine mine 
(e.g.. White and Wright, 193*), and certain studies have 
reported features which tend to reinforce these views. 
Occurrences of very fine-grained pyrite beneath the fringe 
surface (Jost, 1968; Rohrbacher, 1969; Vogel and 
Ehrlich, 1971% have been cited as favouring a syngenetic 
origin. In fact, the mine personnel have been known to ask 
whether visitors wish to have the syngenetic or epigenetic 
(diagenetic) tour. In the writers' opinion , thorough testing of 
discrepancies between the two hypotheses has not yet been 
carried out; briefings before the current underground tour 
will undoubtedly include discussions on this topic.
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The crushing plant has a standard flow scheme for copper ore crushing. 
Primary crushing is accomplished underground, while the surface plant 
consists of two 7 foot standard cone crushers and four 7 foot shorthead 
crushers.
A single belt delivers ore to two coarse ore bins with a total of 3,000 
tons live load capacity. Standard crusher product is stored in four 
medium ore bins each having 1,500 tons live load capacity. The crushing 
train is connected with the feeders, belts, screens and chutes.
Three grinding sections consist to two 10-1/2 foot by 14 foot rod mills 
and two 12 foot by 13 foot grate discharge ball mills. Grinding capacity 
is 15,000 tons per day. The rod mills grind in open circuit with the 
discharge pumped to cyclones. Cyclone overflows are delivered to 
primary flotation and the underflows discharge to the ball mills which 
close the ball mill circuits.
The flow scheme for the flotation circuits is as follows: primary
cyclone overflow reports to the primary flotation machines from which a 
rougher concentrate is produced. The tailings from the primary cells are 
deslimed in cyclones with the slime overflow reporting to the tailings. 
The cyclone underflows discharge to the secondary flotation machines 
which produce a concentrate and a sand tailing. The primary and 
secondary (or scavenger) concentrates are combined, classified in 
cyclones, and reground in the tube mills.
Section I has one 10 foot by 20 foot regrind mill. Sections II and III 
each have two 8 foot by 22 foot regrind mills. The regrind circuits are 
all closed with two stages of cyclones with the second stage overflow 
reporting to cleaner flotation. The cleaner concentrate is recleaned 
once. Cleaner tailings report to the primary grinding circuit at the 
cyclones. Recleaner tailings report to the first stage cyclones in the 
regrind circuit.
Concentrate dewatering is accomplished in a conventional manner by 
thickening and filtering. The moisture in the resulting filter cake is 
approximately 18% which is reduced to about 10% in as rotary dryer.
Average recovery at the Copper Range concentrator is 88%.
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Wagner shuttle cars, 18 ton capacity, 
diesel and scooptrams, 5 ton capac­
ity, diesel.
Stamler feeder breakers, 400 TPH 
capacity, electric.
Two ore pockets, capacity 6,000 tons. 
Special belt-type feeder.
Conveyors out of mine. One 54* belt 
1,800' long, one 54" belt 1,600' 
long, each driven by three 250 hp 
motors. Following 54" belt system 
carries ore to coarse ore bins or 
stockpile.
Two coarse ore bins, 1,500 ton live 
load each.
Four vibrating grisslies with 1-1/2" 
slotted openings on top deck and 7/8" 
square openings on bottom deck.
Two Symons 7' standard cone crushers. 
Scissors belt system to top of 
tertiary ore bins.
Four tertiary ore bins, 1,500 tons 
live load each.
Four varispeed belt feeders.
Four vibrating screens, two 6' x 14* 
and two 6' x 16'.
Four Symons 7' shorthead cone 
crushers.
Collecting conveyor for screen under­
size, 42"; then 60"; then 54" belt 
system to top of fine ore bins where 
ore is distributed by two 42" 
shuttle conveyors running in 
opposite directions.
Six fine ore bins of 1,600 tons live 
load each, plus 6,000 ton bin for 
Section 4.
Four belt feeders each under bins #1 
thru 86. Six belt feeders under 17. 
Belt feeders discharge onto a 
collecting conveyor.
The collecting belt discharges onto 
inclined rod mill feed belt.
Seven weightoaeters, one installed on 
each rod mill feed belt, records 
tonnage to mills.
Six 10-1/2' x 14' Allis Chalmers rod 
mills, two in each Section 1 thru 3, 
speed 16.2 rpm, 66.9% of critical 
speed. One 13' x 20*8* Nordberg rod 
mill in Sec. 4, speed 13.03 rpm, 60% 
of critical speed.
Six 12’ x 13' Marcy grate discharge 
ball mills, ni-hard shell liners in 
Sec. 1 thru 3, speed 16 rpm, 72.6% 
of critical speed, two mills per 
section. One 14' x 33' Nordberg 
overflow ball mill in Sec. 4, speed 
14.4 rpm, 69% of critical speed.
Six 20" diameter primary cyclone 
with each ball mill in Sec. 1 thru 
3. Twenty 15" diameter in Sec. 4. 
Primary cyclone overflow pumped to 
distributor for primary flotation. 
Nine rows, 10 cells each, 66"
Wemco fagergren flotation cells 
plus three rows of 8 cells Wemco 
#120 machines in Sec. 1 thru 3.
One row of twelve 66" Agitair and 
5 rows of twelve 66" Wemco fager­
gren cells in Sec. 4.
27. Seventy-eight 10" diameter Krebs 
cyclones to deslime primary 
rougher tail with 18 cyblones each, 
in Sec. 1 thru 3 and 24 in Sec. 4.
28. Sixteen rows of 12 cells each 66" 
Wemco fagergren flotation cells. 
Four rows in each of the four sec­
tions .
29. Primary and secondary flotation 
concentrate in addition to regrind 
mill discharge and recleaner flo­
tation tails plus silver circuit 
cyclone overflow.
30. Twenty-one 15" Krebs cyclones on 
first stage regrind classifica­
tion, 5 per Sec. 1 thru 3, 6 in 
Sec. 4.
31. Twenty-four 6" Krebs second-stage 
regrind cyclones in each of the 
four sections.
32. Four 8* x 22’ Traylor regrind 
mills, 500 hp motors, 2 each in 
Sec. 2 and 3; one 10' x 20' Marcy 
mill, 1,000 hp motor in Sec. 1 and 
one 13' x 20'8" Nordberg, 1,500 hp 
in Sec. 4.
33. Cleaner flotation, all sections 
have 4 rows of 10 cells each 66" 
Wemco fagergren cells.
34. Recleaner flotation 
Section 1 -
4 rows of 6 cells each #24 Denver 
Section 2 -
1 row of 6 cells #24 Denver
1 row of 6 cells #48 Denver
2 rows of 4 #24 ♦ 2 #48 
Section 3 -
1 row of 6 cells #48 Denver
3 rows of 4 *24 + 2 #48 
Section 4 -
4 rows of 6 cells #60 Agitair
35. Thickener, one 100' Dorco and one 
100' Eimco.
36. Filter, two 10' x 18' Filtration 
Engineers, Inc., string discharge, 
one Eimco agidiac hiflow, steam 
hood.
37. One rotary kiln dryer, 10' x 70' 
by Koppers Co.
38. Fluxed copper concentrate.
39. Copper bleed gate in regrind mill 
discharge taps circulating load of 
native copper and silver.
40. One 6" Krebs cyclone.
41. Two #8 Denver cells.
42. One #8 Denver cell.
43. One 6" Krebs cyclone.
44. Four #8 Denver cells with air 
shutoff.
45. Two rows of six #8 Denver cells.
46. Three buckets lined with filter 
cloth.




The Copper Range smelter was constructed in 1955 and consists of a dryer, 
reverberator/ furnace, converters, refining furnaces and a Contilanod 
continuous anode casting system. In 1980, Louisiana Land and Exploration 
allocated $78,000,000 for the construction of an anode casting facility, 
an electrolytic copper refinery and a shape casting facility.
Prior to being fed to the reverberator/ furnace. Copper Range concentrate 
is mixed with lime, pyrite and other materials and then dried in a natural 
gas fired rotary drier. The hot waste gasses from the drier are treated 
by a two stage wet scrubber to recover particulates.
The Ho. 2 furnace, originally built In 1967, measures 110 feet by 35 
feet. It was rebuilt in 1975 and was restarted in May of 1986. The 
normal capacity range is 500 to 600 tons per day of Copper Range 
concentrate. It is fired with a mixture of pulverized coal and preheated 
air. The furnace slag, containing 1.0% copper is removed and hauled to 
the slag dump for disposal. The matte (63% copper, 12% iron and 22% 
sulfur) is tapped and transferred to the converters. The hot waste gasses 
from the reverberator/ furnace provide heat for waste heat boilers which 
generate high pressure steam for conversion to electrical energy in the 
power plant. The waste gasses are treated by an electrostatic 
precipitator to remove particulates and the clean gasses are discharged to 
the atmosphere through the 504 foot high main stack.
Because of the high grade matte (60% to 65% copper), converter slag blows 
are short (15 to 30 minutes). À typical converter cycle would consist of 
blowing a charge of four ladles of matte and two of slag for about 30 
minutes and then two matte and one slag for 15 minutes. In the 
converters, the matte is reduced to blister copper by blowing air into the 
converters and oxidizing iron and sulfur in the matte. The iron oxide is 
combined with the flux to form molten slag which is removed and recycled 
to the reverberator/ furnace. After the final copper making blow, the 
blister copper containing 99% copper is transferred to a holding furnace 
or directly to a refining furnace.
Each converter can produce about 5,000 tons of blister copper per month. 
This amount would be equivalent to copper from 15,000 tons of Copper Range 
concentrate and a mill production rate of 650 tons per day. Maintenance 
on converters usually consists of occasional patching and tuyere line 
renewal about every 150 to 225 charges.
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Two 36 by 18 foot gas or oil fired reverberator/ type furnaces, each 
holding 250 tons of blister copper, are used to refine the blister copper 
to anode grade copper. The major impurity, oxygen, is removed by burning 
green hardwood logs submerged in the bath which draw draw oxygen from the 
copper for the combustion of the logs. The exhaust gasses from the two 
refining furnaces are discharged to the atmosphere through two separate 
125 foot stacks.
Anode grade copper is manually tapped by a tap slot and launder to a five 
ton gas fired holding furnace. The holding furnace is part of the 
Contilanod process, licensed by Métallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, for the 
continuous casting of anodes.
The anode casting system was commissioned in 1982. It consists of the 
five ton holding furnace, a 42 ton per hour Hazelett Caster, pinch rolls, 
two parallel plasma arc torches, a cooling chamber and a stacker. The 
anode supporting lugs are integrally cast on the continuously cast slab 
and the torches cut the anode profiles forming individual 640 pound 
anodes. The Contilanod system has demonstrated very good reliability and 
produces excellent quality anodes which have planar surfaces and are free 
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The copper refinery is designed to produce high purity cathodes and high 
quality electrolytic tough pitch copper in the fore of continuous cast 
wire bars, billets and cakes. In addition, deeopperized anode slimes 
containing silver, gold and selenium are produced.
The previous fire refining furnaces are now used to produce anodes for 
the tenkhouse. They receive blister copper from the converters, as well 
as spent anodes and other scrap. After the anode charge has been treated 
to the proper metallurgy for casting anodes, the copper is transferred to 
a holding furnace and then to the Hazelett caster
Here the copper is poured between two continuous, water cooled, flexible 
steel belts with bronze dam blocks on the sides. A solidified copper 
strip with integral lugs emerges through pinch rollers to a cutting 
machine which cuts the anode profile with plasma arc torches. The lugs 
on the upper ends of the anodes allow them to be hung in the electrolytic 
cells. After casting, the cooled anodes are carried to the anode storage 
building by forklift truck.
The anodes are moved to a machine which automatically spaces them for 
placing in cells. The tankhouse crane carried the spaced anodes to the 
cell area, which contains 278 commercial or production cells. Each cell 
holds 57 anodes weighing approximately 18 tons total.
The cells contain an acidic copper sulfate solution, called electrolyte, 
which circulates continuously at a temperature of 14$ degrees f. A 
direct current of approximately 25,000 arperes is applies by means of a 
heavy copper buss bar which joins the sections of cells together in an 
electrical circuit. In the electro refining process, the impure anodes 
dissolve into the electrolyte and pure copper is deposited onto inert 
stainless steel blanks to form cathodes. (After 21 days, the anode scrap 
remaining from the refining process - approximately 12-151 of the 
original weight - is washed free of adhering slimes to be remelted into 
new anodes.)
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spray cooling pond and then reused in the mine, crusher and 
concentrator. Wastewaters generated at White Pine, are routed to the 
Worth Wo. 2 tailings basin to give a single point discharge to the 
Mineral River via Perch Creek.
The electrolytic refinery adds 80% more load to the pre-existing steam 
systems. After evaluation of various fuels and boiler systems, a wood 
burning steam plant was selected. Chips are obtained from the Mead 
Corporation and Company owned land. Wood chips cost per BTU is one-third 
less than coal. At full capacity, the plant can handle 100 tons of chips 
per day.
ER-3708 170
COPPER RANGE COMPANY REFINERY FLOW SHEET
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UTILITIES
The White Pine power plant supplies electric power to the White Pine 
complex, including the mine, concentrator, smelter, refinery and other 
surface facilities. Total installed electric generating capacity is 60 
megawatts (Mw), supplemented by an intertie of 8 Mw with the Upper 
Peninsula Power Company. The plant also supplies heating steam to the 
surface facilities. The power plant has three steam turbine generators 
(20 Mw each). The two smelter waste heat boilers supplying steam to 
electric generators receive hot gases from the reverberatory furnaces.
The other two power boilers supplying steam to electric generators are 
fired by pulverised coal. Additional heating steam is supplied by the 
two heating boilers and a wood burning steam plant. This plant has a 
wood fired boiler and a standby gas fired boiler.
The total power generating capability has a net heating rate of 13,500 
BTU per KWH for an electric generating efficiency of 25.21. If the heat 
in the reverberatory furnace or smelter waste gases is not considered and 
the heat rate is based only on the fuel burned in the power plant, the 
heating rate is 9,360 BTU per KWH for an electric generating efficiency 
of 36.5%.
Exhaust gases from the waste heat boilers pass through an electrostatic 
precipitator for removal of particulates before discharge to the 
atmosphere. Emission restrictions for 80% presently are being met by 
burning coal with a sulfur content of less than 1.5%, so that the 
coal-fired boilers comply with Michigan administrative rules. This is 
the limit for power plants with total generating capacity of less than 
500,000 pounds per hour (White Pine's steaming capacity is 460,000). 
Cyclone collectors remove particulates from the exhaust gases from the 
coal-fired power boilers to guarantee conformance with state limits on 
particulates.
The power plant boiler make-up is demineralized/evaporated potable water, 
which is passed through a carbon filter prior to demineralization.
Service (Lake Superior) water is the feed to the three evaporators.
Water is obtained from Lake Superior via two buried pipelines (42” and 
36” diameters) for potable water supply to the towns!te and mine complex 
and for use as process and service water in the plant. Water is 
withdrawn from the lake through a submerged intake located 1/4 mile off 
shore at Silver City. The pumphouse, located at Silver City, has a 
capacity of 36.5 million gallons per day (MOD). At full production, 
nearly 30 million gallons of water were pumped daily through the six mile 
long pipelines. Approximately 590,000 gallons per day are treated by 
filtration, chlorination and fluoridation and distributed to the town and 
mine for potable supplies. The remainder of the water is diverted to the 
company power plant for condenser cooling, a non-contact use. After 
passing through the power condensers, the heated water is pumped to a
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Allouez 0 1 1 Wakefield 8 45 53
Atlantic Mine 0 2 2 Watersmeet 0 4 4
Baraga 0 4 4 Watton 0 1 1
Bergland 15 37 52 White Pine 71 113 184
Bessemer 6 4 5 51 179 710 889
Bruce Crossing 5 33 38
Calumet 2 14 16
Caspian 0 2 2
Chas se 11 0 5 5 Wisconsin




















































5 6Iron River 0 4 4
Ironwood 2 0 134 154 Grand Total 185 760 945Kearsarge 0 2 2
Kenton 0 2 2
Lake Linden 1 9 1 0
L 'Anse 1 0 1 BY. COUNTIES
Laurium 0 6 6
Marenisco 8 4 1 2 Ontonagon 4 53
Mass City 1 13 14 Gogebic 295
Merriweather 1 4 5 Houghton 115
Mohawk 0 1 1 Iron-WI 55
N i sula 0 5 5 Baraga 1 1
Ontonagon 2 0 64 84 Iron-MI 8
Pa inesdale 1 13 14 Keweenaw 2
Pelkie 0 5 5 Other I
Ramsay 4 17 2 1 945
Rockland 0 1 1 1 1
S idnaw 1 1 2 53 Zip Codes
South Range 2 5 7 8  Counties
S tambaugh 0 1 1 2 States forTo ivola 0 8 8 84 mile round- trip non-r
Trimountain 0 6 6
Trout Creek 4 2 0 24
ARTHUR LAKES LIBRARY
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APPENDIX E 
COPPER RANGE INCENTIVE PLAN
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Copper Range believes that peeple make productivity happen -the Copper Range incentive nan is 
aimed at sharing the benefits of people's efforts to improve operations by paying out fcslf the gains
from improved productivity.
White Pine must turn out much more copper with fever people, if it is to survive against Chilean and 
African copper producers - it is not necessary to drop to their lov veges - it is necessary to be more 
productive so that jobs can be secure - that means making a smell profit at 60$ copper
Keaaecatt Capper is getting ready to put over $400 million into their Bingham Canyon mine in 
Utah, with the intention of re-opening in 1988. Lets look at their manning numbers
flannino Tons Copper/ Year Tons/Man
1981 6.700 200,000 30
1983 4.700 200.000 43
Projected 1988 2.100 185.000 88
This is the response of a very good mine to the need to be competitive in order to survive - their costs 
vere about the same as White Pine in the past years.
White Pina has a similar program - and the general measures are :
Mannina Tons Conner/ Year Tons/Man
1981 1.310 43.362 33
Low estimate 1986 950 50,000 53
Mid Estimate 1986 950 60.000 63
High Estimate 1986 950 70.000 74
The challenge is there - the high estimate may be more than ve can produce right nov - but vith 
improvements over a year or so, it should be reachable.
Money is not the only measure of vork satisfaction - a good vorking environment provides many 
other important satisfactions - but cash payments from a fair sharing plan prove that there is more 
than nice words to productivity incentives.
White Pi ne is part of " Smoke Stack America " - the social hardship of the old adversarial vork 
practices are veil known. Copper Range "s Business Plan is based on participative management. It 
w ill vork as veil but no better than ve, jointly, make it vork . Productivity is not administered to 
the people - Copper Range people's pride in performance is the best supervision. The incentive 
system is one of many ways to recognize performance - it is complicated, but please read through it 
to get an under standi ng and to suggest better vays as it progresses.
This story says much about working with fever people - but productivity is the best way to enlarge 
the payroll - there are abundant geologic reserves at White Pine - the better our productivity - the 
lover the cost, and then the better the opportunity to expand. The smelter/ refinery cannot handle 
more than about 70,000 tons of copper per year - but ve can sell any surplus as concentrate and 
offer new job opportunities to the UP workforce.
The old adversary relation must go - survival means i f  the company vins - the people win !
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_____________ Brief »f tbt Itctitivt PUi
e The Plan starts on January 6,1986 allowing for 2 months startup.
e Copper Range people are divided into six groups of roughly 150 people In each group :
Mine Production 
Mi ne Services 
Mine Maintenance
Processing (Mill,Smelter, Refinery)
Plant Maintenance & Services
Pover & Staff Services - Power Plant, Administration and Technical Services
Everyone is in the incentive plan, except the President, Vice Presidents and the Resident 
Manager.
• Incentives are earned from:
V Operating at higher safety levels
V More copper produced per person
V  Savings in materials used.
# Incentives will be paid once a month after the previous months operations are analyzed - about 
middle of February for January.
Productivity earnings are in addition to base salary or wage rates - they can never decrease pay - 
only add to it. Productivity should improve over the years and result in higher incentive earnings as 
the new work methods and practices are mastered.
Good communication is essential to better productivity - everyone is encouraged to use their 
creativity and ingenuity to improve results - management will review all proposed actions to be sure 
that the vital aspects of employee safety and plant reliability are maintained. Participative 
management means really listening to these suggestions.
This plan does not affect the company and union rights under the collective bargaining agreement - it 
is an expansion of the participative management concept.
Base Minimum Incentives
As pert of the wage agreements a base mi ai mam incentive ef 50$ par bear will be peid at all 
times - this allows for the reality that productivity during startup will not reach base levels for a 
little while- and some payment is essential for good morale. But at the start the minimum incentive 
will be paid into a Wage and Salary Escrow Fund as security for $2 million badly needed dollars 
loaned by Phibro - more about this later on.
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Page 3
5a me Ones t iw  and Answers
Who is eligible ?
All Copper Range people - temporary, part-time and probationary included -who have actual time 
worked during the incentive period and are working at the end of the period are eligible for incentive 
earnings When a person shifts from one incentive group to another inside an incentive period, that 
person s incentive will be based on actual time worked in each group
Can I check the records ?
All incentive calculations of a group are available to that group. 
how do 1 share in mu Group's Incentive Ear ni nos ?
The total incentive earnings for each Group are divided among individuals based on actual hours 
worked. Incentives will not be paid for time for which pay is received but time is not worked - such 
as vacations and holidays The same rules apply to hourly and salaried people.
When are incentives paid ?
Calculating incentives takes about 10 days - and a special payroll will be made about mid-month to 
cover all incentives earned in the previous month. It will be similar to the regular payroll with 
deductions and so forth
Does the Base keen chanoine ?
Changes are only for big differences in operation. Mutual trust must be built up to encourage reel 
teamwork. Giving time to improve productivity is part of that trust.
There may be times when the base index must be changed or modified. The start of the smelter and 
refinery are examples. A major change in the grade of ore may necessitate change. Major 
expenditures for new technology which improves productivity could also bring about change The 
reason for this is the fact that many major improvements are cost justified on the basis of unit cost 
savings. As a company owner you would partlcipate in the cost savings through profit sharing and 
potentially higher values for your shares - but not necessarily higher incentive pay. This is 
necessary to be able, as a company , to justify major improvements to lower cost and improve your 
job security
Caleilatiaa Incentives
Total Incentives earned by a group are:
± Labor productivity Incentive Earnings 
± Safety Incentive Earnings 
± Material Incentive Ear nines 
Total Incentive Earnings
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___________________ 1 Libtr PrW#ctivit# Ear linos
The Labor Productivity Base is measured as pounds of copper in concentrates from the mill divided by 
manhours for each group. These bases for each group are measured as.
Base Pttads Caaacr/ Maahair
Mine Production 249
Mi ne Services 362
Mine Maintenance 388
Processing 833 (until smelter and refinery are added in )
Plant Maintenance & Services 424 (until smelter and refinery are added in )
Pover and Staff Services 385
These bases look to the manning levels in all departments and relate to the overall objectives for 
economic survival of more pounds of copper out-turned.
Base Maabears are the Actual pounds of Copper in Concentrate
Base Pounds Copper/manhour.
For oxompfe i f  2 0 1 poo pio in H i no Production res ut tod in 10 ,000 ,000  pounds of 
copper in concontrotos, the orithmotic vouid be. i 0 ,0 00 ,000  /2 4 9  » 40, tê t  Bose 
fionhours
I nceative Msahaart =1/2(Base Manhours - Actual Manhours) - in the oxompio ossumo tôû  
mon hours per employee in the month or on octuol mon hours of 52, i 60  (  160  x 2 0 i  
peopie )  end the incentive men hours ore
40 ,16} Bose Mon hours 
toss 52 .160  Actuoi Monhours 
equois B, 0 0 0 /2  or 4, OOO incentive mon hours eorned by the Mine
Production Group..
Laber Pradsctivfty incentive Earninysare the Incentive Manhour times $8.50 / hour Rate.
in the exc vpie, the Mine Production Group corns for the month 4 ,000 hours x 
SB. 50  or $54, OOO This incentive comings is divided by 5 2 ,160  hours worked by 
the Group to equoi $  i. 06 per hour. Boch individuot would get their hours worked 
times $1.06 os their shore of incentive comings.
____________________ 2. Material Incentive Ear nines
Base Material Units = Actual Pounds of Conner in Concentrate
Standard Material Units/Pound of Copper
Incentive Material Units = 1/2 (Base Material Units - Actual Material Units)
Material Incentive Earnings = Incentive Material Units x Rate
Material incentive measures require about three months experience to build up, and they will be 
incorporated in incentive earnings around April of 1986. They relate to big material costs like coal 
burned, rod and ball mill grinding media, powder, diesel fuel etc. so that a careful production team 
can hold down vaste and share in the economic benefits.
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“Safety is Everybody’s Business M The Base for measuring safety is the 5- year historical average of 
the liiclieit Rite - that is the injuries that require two or more medical treatments per 200,000 
manhours worked This statistic is required by government agencies and is closely watched - the 
historical average is 8.2.
Similar to Labor Productivity measurements - but seeking the lowest accident experience ( vs 
highest production):
Base Maeheers » Actual Total Incident Cases x 200,000 / 8.2 (Historical Incident Rate)
Safe!| laceative Heirs •$%( 1 /2(Actual Manhours - Base Manhours))
Safety laceittve Eariiiys = Incentive Manhours x Rate
Assuming ên txêmpU vith 776 peopU working 160 hours, or i2 4 ,160 octuol 
monhours:
6 coses No Coses
Actuoi Monhours 124, }60  124,160
Less: âose Monhours 6 x 2 0 0 ,OOO/0.2  Ox 200 ,OOO/0.2
eguols - 146.541 - 0
‘ 22,101 124,160
Times 1 /2  - 11,090 62, OOO
Times 5% ‘ 554  3 ,1 04
Sofety Incentive Eornings 
f SO. 5 0 /  hour ‘ $4, 709 S 26 ,304
Divided by 124,160 hours • $  0 .04  $0.21
____________________ PmiH S m ir i
i f  e month shoved 10 million pounds production, end vith sog 160 hours per men 
in the month, the vhote picture might look like .
*  People Hours Base Incentive Incentive Incentive/
Actual Manhnurs Manhours Eacniags_flanhnur
Mine Production 201 32.160 40.161 4.000 $34.000 $ 1.06
Mine services 138 22.080 27.624 2.772 23.562 1.06
Mine Maintenance 129 20.640 25.773 2.566 21.811 1.06
Processing (m ill) 60 9.600 12,005 1.202 10.217 1.06
Plant Maint. & Svce 118 18.880 23.585 2.352 19.992 1.06
Pow er&Staff 130 20.800 25.974 2.587 21.990 1.06
The earnings (loss) from safety incentives and from material incentives would be added 
(subtracted) from the Production Incentives to arrive at the Total Incentive System earnings
These are only quick guesses - the expectation is that each team will have the same opportunity to 
earn incentives. And, of course, when the smelter and refinery come on, there will be about another 
130 people on force.
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Witc AM SaUri Escrtv FiM
Negotiations to buy Copper Range stalled just $ 2 million short of target - and Phibro offered to 
provide the money if they could have collateral of $ 1 million withheld from the 50*/hour Base 
Minimum Incentive payments. This was agreed to by the Directors of Northern Copper (Wood,Kirsch, 
Dunn, Burkhammer)- Northern Copper acquired and became Copper Range Company
This means that the minimum payments of 50$ per hour will be paid into a bank account ( at the 
First of America Bank - Detroit ) as collateral for Phibro until the withholding plus interest earned 
is equal to $ 1 million.
*■1 iecaetive ear ni ays abeve 50* per beer will be pel* immediately a ad directly te 
tbe employees
The Escrow Fund would build up at roughly $ 85/ month per employee - and it would take until 
March of 1987 to reach $ 1 million - -or about $1,100 per employee. This money is not taxable 
until paid back to employees - then tax would be withheld. Employees who leave during the Escrow 
Fund period will be paid when the Escrow Fund pays out.
The Phibro Loan now stands at $ 1,500,000 and it is hoped that startup can be accomplished without 
drawing the last $ 500,000. The loan is scheduled to be paid out by mid 1987 - but with some luck 
on copper prices it could be paid down sooner
If the employees are successful and productive - the way management believes they can be - the 
startup will be profitable and the loan will pay down earlier. Once the Phibro Senior Loan is paid off, 
the balance in the bank account will be paid out directly to the employees in proportion to the 
minimum incentive earnings credited to each individual.
If the operations should fail - Phibro would be entitled to these escrow funds as a partial payback of 
moneys advanced.
This is a very short summary of very lengthy legal documents - there are other clauses covering 
prolonged periods before payout which are not likely to come into play. The agreements are available 
for your review during regular business hours at the Administration Building.
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FROM Trainers/J. Chellor ^y _______
SUBJECT F'lnal Results of the Work Group Survey DATE September 14, 1988
To Facllilal# Corre:pend#nc# And Filing Un S#p#r#(# Shot For EicH Topic
SURVEY RESULTS: Total Of 88 Groups, 79 Responses (90%)
Question: Yes No Don't Know
1. Is work group effective?
Mine 43% 33% 24%
Surface 76% 15% 9%
TOTAL 57% 25% 18%
2. Is work group ineffective?
Mine 37% 44% 19%
Surface 24% 61% 15%
TOTAL 32% 50% 18%
3. CR success w/o employee involvement?
Mine 9% 72% 19%
Surface 3% 91% 6%
TOTAL 6% 80% 14%




In addition to the yes/no answers to the five questions asked on the work 
group survey sheets, numerous comments were made. I have recapped and 
combined similar reasons given. The number (X) preceding each comment, 
indicates the total responses that were similar. The quoted comments are as 
given, non— quoted are a generalized recap.
QUESTION 1. Do you think vour work group is effective?
Comments:
(14) 1. Yes. We hold regular meetings which provides improved
communication.
(30) 2. Yes. We are solving problems, cutting costs, and concentrating on
safety.
(5) 3. No. Very little is accomplished.
(3) 4. No. "Information on problems is exchanged but nothing Is done to
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alleviate the problem".
(2) 5. Yes. Holding meetings and problem solving until the cave 
temporarily disrupted it. We are now starting again.
(13) 6. Yes/No. Our group is effective in what we do but noTso beyond 
that. "We assume that someone is trying to tell us that what we do 
is not important".
(6) 7. No. "No cooperation".
(4) 8. No. "Projects are always ongoing or out of group's authority".
9. No. "We should have higher management at some meetings".
10. No. "Before the cave we ha</ a voice in problems and changes in 
company issues. Since then we have no say so".
11. Yes.
that
"Better attitudes about the job and the company. Learning 
we are not the only ones with problems."
12. No. "We are confined to a small area."
13. No. "A lot of items appear to fall on deaf ears. No faith in our 
leaders anymore."
14. No. "1. Lack of cooperation from all involved.
2. Lack of guidance.
3. Lack of feedback."
15. No. "Yes. When we do what management wants."
QUESTION 2. Do you think vour work arouo is ineffective?
Comments:
1. Yes. "Problem solving isn't making jobs easier."
(2) 2. Yes. "Added tasks take time."
(14) 3. Yes. Running into roadblocks and getting the runaround.
(2) 4. Yes. "Not holding enough meetings."
5. Yes. "Lack of communications."
(3) 6. Yes. "We would like better answers to our questions."
(3) 7. Yes. Lack of cooperation from the office (management).
8. No. "Solve problems as they arise."
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9. No. "No, but it would be better if ail got involved instead of a
few doing all the talking."
10. Yes. "Management is going through . the motions but employees
believe that employee involvement is nonexistent."
11. No. "Group has made improvements in job safety, easier, morale."
12. Yes. "We need more information on what the company has planned for
the future for the Mine Department."
13. Yes. "Low morale because we don't have enough equipment to get the
rock out."
14. No. "Most of our department goals set a year ago have been
completed."
(3) 15. Yes. Items not corrected by the group are carried over and over.
Problem getting outside help.
16. Yes. "When we want what management hasn't thought of yet."
QUESTION 3. Do vou think Copper Range can be successful without employee 
involvement?
Comments:
1. No. "Stress more Involvement."
(2) 2. No. "Proven that it works."
(3) 3. No. "Definitely not. Need the program for efficiency."
(3) 4. No. Could run smoother and be more profitable if employee owned 
company ran the way it was intended.
(3) 5. No. "But more cooperation is needed."
(2) 6. No. "Projects such as tunnel, belts, and reverb wouldn't have been
possible.
7. No. "We don't think we have enough of it. Some of management
doesn't listen or ask employee's opinions."
8. Yes/No. "Strength of the company is in the active involvement of 
employee owners."





















No. "Because it affects everybody."
Yes. "But a lot of short term problem solving is done. Unit runs 
smoother, less bitching. Worth the one hour loss."
? "Have enough worthwhile (i.e. cost savings, increased 
productivity) ideas been implemented to offset lost production 
time?"
Yes. "As of now, employee involvement has very little to do with 
the success of the company. If the company is, as of now, 
successful it is without employee involvement."
Yes. "It can be successful without but the value of employee 
involvement lies in the difference between marginally successful 
and comfortably profitable. Employee involvement will provide 
higher profits, better environment, and job security."
Yes. "The old company operated for many years without employee 
involvement."
No. "That's why we're in the shape we're in."
No. "It prevents grievances."
. What is vour group doing to make the employee involvement process
Holding meetings, group input, getting involved.
Problem solving and cutting costs.
Better cooperation between hourly and management.
Trying hard but it gets discouraging. No results.
"Working many extra hours because of lack of personnel."
"Trying to get input from all work groups. Fifty percent is not 
enough."
"Not much. Not wasting time at meetings."
"Trying to get along with supervision as another worker instead of 
as a supervisor."
Encouraging work group participation and working with trainers to 





















"Extra effort after fall of ground."
"Safety training of work group."
"Taking the initiative instead of just reacting to events." 
"Nothing."
"What can we do if no one listens? Many items brought up should 
not be our responsibility. Examples: junction boxes, pipe, water
in headings, road rock. These are foreman's job. Why should we do 
their job?"
"Our problem should be your problem no matter how small or large."
Trying to involve others in our meetings and attend other group 
meetings. Some on our own time.
"Superintendents (surface) spend numerous hours with their work 
groups. Trying to get groups to forget other departments and focus 
on own problems. All superintendents are available to attend group 
meetings on request."
. Do the members of vour work group feel like part owners of the
No. "No say in company involvement."
No. "Due to some answers from management, we question whether 
we're respected as part owners."
No. "Don't feel like owners until we see profit sharing."
No. "Not enough say about major decisions."
No. "Not all equal part owners because of the way shares are 
divided. Can't get maximum amount."
No. "Better communications with management. Less stonewalling."
No. "We hear a lot on the positive side but haven't received 
nothing yet."
No. "We have no say so on what's happening. All we hear is 
promises."
No. "When the company started out everybody had a good attitude - 
now that attitude is slowly changing because of middle management. 
On new installations we are rarely consulted. There's no planning 
- we are told how to do the job and they don't listen to our 
suggestions."
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10. Ho. "True feeling of ownership in the beginning but that feeling 
has changed in the last year."
11. "More Involvement by upper management at group meetings to impress 
employees that they are owners."
GENERAL ADD OH COMMENTS:
1. Feedback from trainers is desired.
2. "Special bonus pay (tunnel job) not fair. All working for common 
goal of company success and job retention."
3. "Too many companies within a company."
PERSONAL COHMBNTS/CHBLLBR:
1. There is more cooperation* communication, and a better attitude 
between management and work groups on surface than there is 
underground.
2. Why can't mine work groups hold their meetings on surface at the 
start of the shift?
a. Ho additional work time is lost.
b. Assures meetings, not lip service.
c. More access to groups by management.
d. Facilitates cross group meetings, i.e. unite and maintenance, 
units and support departments such as surveyors.
We have continuous problems with drifts off line, overwidth, 
wrong horizons, etc., yet can't take the time to educate the 
work force?
3. There is a lot of reference to stonewalling, lack of cooperation by 
management and other departments, lack of follow up, ongoing 
problems with no progress, etc. Obviously this is not just a few 
disgruntled work groups' opinion.
4. A widespread opinion is that management goes along with the work 
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